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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in a capital case. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
In May 1982, James W. Riley and two co-defendants, 
Tyrone Baxter and Michael Williams, wer e indicted in 
Delaware for felony murder, intentional murder, and lesser 
offenses stemming from the robbery of a liquor store and 
the fatal shooting of the owner in February 1982. Riley 
pleaded not guilty to all of the charges and was tried by 
jury in Kent County Superior Court in December 1982. He 
was represented by appointed counsel. 
 
At trial, Riley's co-defendants testified as follows for the 
prosecution. On the afternoon of the shooting, Williams 
agreed to give Riley and Baxter a ride to the bus station, 
but on the way, he stopped, at their request at a store 
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called Sandbar Liquors, because Riley and Baxter wanted 
to get some beer and rob the store. W illiams parked near 
the liquor store and waited in the car, while Riley and 
Baxter walked to the store. Armed with a gun, Riley placed 
a quart bottle of beer on the counter and announced that 
the store was being robbed. When the stor e owner, James 
Feeley, backed away from the cash register , Baxter grabbed 
the money out of the cash drawer. Riley tried to take 
Feeley's wallet, but Feeley resisted. At Baxter's urging, Riley 
shot Feeley in the leg. As Riley and Baxter wer e leaving, 
Feeley threw a wine bottle that struck Riley in the arm. 
Riley then shot Feeley in the chest, killing him. In addition 
to this testimony, the prosecution intr oduced evidence that 
Riley's fingerprints were found on the bottle of beer that 
had been placed on the counter. 
 
Riley took the stand in his own defense and testified that 
he was in Philadelphia with his mother celebrating her 
birthday when the robbery occurred. Although Riley's 
mother was present in court at the beginning of the trial, 
she did not testify, and no other alibi witnesses were 
presented. However, Gary Momenko, an inmate at the 
Delaware Correctional Center, testified that Baxter had 
admitted that he, rather than Riley, had fir ed the shot that 
killed Feeley. 
 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all five counts. 
The state sought the death penalty on the felony mur der 
conviction, and four days later, the penalty phase of the 
trial was held. The jury unanimously recommended a 
sentence of death, and based on this recommendation, the 
trial court sentenced Riley to death. After Riley was 
sentenced on the remaining counts for which he had been 
convicted, he appealed. 
 
On direct appeal, Riley continued to be r epresented by 
his trial counsel. In addition, the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Delaware, Inc., participated in the appeal by filing 
an amicus curiae brief and by assisting trial counsel. 
 
In July 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed 
Riley's conviction and death sentence. Riley v. State, 496 
A.2d 997 (Del. 1985) ("Riley I "). The Supr eme Court of the 
United States denied certiorari. Riley v. Delaware, 478 U.S. 
1022 (1986). 
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Represented by new counsel, Riley filed a motion for 
post-conviction relief in Kent County Superior Court in 
March 1987. The court conducted three separate hearings 
on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, but 
ultimately the court denied Riley's motion. State v. Riley, 
1988 WL 47076 (Del. Super. 1988) ("Riley II"). 
 
In May 1988, Riley moved for reargument and appealed 
to the Delaware Supreme Court. Shortly thereafter, he filed 
a motion to stay briefing his appeal and to r emand his case 
to the Superior Court to consider his motion for 
reargument. The Delaware Supr eme Court granted that 
motion. 
 
On remand, the Superior Court granted r eargument in 
order to consider Riley's claim that the pr osecution had 
exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially 
discriminatory manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986). State v. Riley, 1988 WL 130430 (Del. 
Super. 1988) ("Riley III"). Following an evidentiary hearing, 
the Superior Court rejected all of Riley's claims, including 
his Batson claim. Riley v. State, Del. Sup. Ct. No. 200, 
1988, Status Report of the Trial Court (April 21, 1989) 
("Riley IV"). On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed, and the United States Supr eme Court again 
denied certiorari. Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719 (Del. 1990) 
("Riley V"), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1223 (1991). 
 
In August 1991, Riley filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254 (1988 & Supp. 
1990) (amended 1996). The District Court granted Riley's 
motion to substitute attorneys from the law firm of 
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom as new lead counsel 
and to allow his post-conviction counsel to continue as co- 
counsel. However, the Court denied new counsel's request 
to file an amended petition. The Court then issued an 
opinion and final order denying the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. Riley v. Snyder, 840 F . Supp. 1012 (D. Del. 
1993). Riley appealed. 
 
A panel of our court reversed the order denying Riley's 
motion for leave to amend his petition and r emanded the 
case for further proceedings. Riley v. T aylor, 62 F.3d 86 (3d 
Cir.1995). 
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On remand, Riley filed a lengthy amended petition in 
August 1995, and the state filed an answer . In his amended 
petition, Riley raised 12 grounds for r elief. In a 
comprehensive opinion, the District Court discussed and 
rejected all of these claims. Riley v. T aylor, Civ. Act. No. 91- 
438-JJF, 1998 WL 172856 (D. Del. Jan. 16, 1998). We 
granted a certificate of probable cause, and Riley then took 
this appeal. 
 
II. 
 
Riley, an African American, first contends that the 
prosecution violated Batson v. Kentucky, supra, by using 
peremptory challenges to strike three African Americans 
from the jury panel because of their race. 1 As a result of 
these strikes, no African Americans sat on the jury. 
 
A. 
 
Before reaching the merits of Riley's Batson claim, we 
must consider whether, as the District Court held and the 
state maintains, this claim is procedurally barred. This 
issue requires us to review the history of the litigation of 
this issue in the state courts. 
 
1. On the eve of trial, Riley's attorney mov ed for 
disqualification of the jury panel. He "did not attack the 
original array or venire," which was 16% black, but he 
"claimed that the panel had later become racially 
disproportionate because the Court excused fr om service a 
substantial number of the prospective jur ors." Riley I, 496 
A.2d at 1007. "The thrust of [his] objection was that 
through judicial excusal of jurors for personal reasons, the 
remaining blacks had been reduced to an unacceptable 
number amounting to about 9% of the remaining venire." 
Id. However, Riley's attorney "did not charge, or even imply, 
that the Trial Judge had excused jurors on racial grounds." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although Riley was tried years before Batson was decided, the 
Supreme Court did not deny certiorari in Riley's direct appeal until 
shortly after Batson was handed down, and therefore Riley is entitled to 
the benefit of that decision. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 
(1987); Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1491 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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Id. Riley's motion to disqualify the entir e panel was denied, 
and a jury was selected. Id. "At no time did defendant 
challenge the State's use of its peremptory challenges or 
even imply that the State was exercising its challenge rights 
on racial grounds." Id. at 1010. After jury selection was 
completed, Riley's attorney raised what he characterized as 
"something of a renewal of an earlier motion" and again 
moved to dismiss the entire jury, arguing that it was not 
"representative of the community and could not give a fair 
and impartial trial." Id. This motion was denied as well. Id. 
 
On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Riley argued 
that the prosecution had exercised thr ee of its peremptory 
challenges on racial grounds. Riley I, 496 A.2d at 1009. 
Addressing this argument, the Delawar e Supreme Court 
held: 
 
       We reject such contention for two r easons, each related 
       to the inadequacy of the record to support the claim. 
       We conclude (1) that no Sixth Amendment per emptory 
       challenge claim was fairly presented to the T rial Court; 
       but (2) even assuming the contrary, defendant failed to 
       meet his burden of establishing a prima facie claim 
       that the State exercised its peremptory challenges on 
       racial grounds. 
 
Id. at 1010. 
 
With respect to the merits of Riley's ar gument, the Court 
held for the first time that racially based per emptories 
violated state law, and the Court devised a pr ocedure much 
like that later adopted in Batson for dealing with objections 
to peremptories. Id. at 1010-13. Under this procedure, a 
defendant who wished to contest a peremptory strike was 
required to make out a prima facie case that the strike was 
based on race. Id. at 1013. The court held, however, that 
Riley had "failed to make the requir ed prima facie showing." 
Id. at 1011. 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision on direct appeal 
did not mark the end of Riley's peremptory challenge claim 
in the state courts. When the Supreme Court decided 
Batson, Riley again raised the issue of racially based 
peremptories in his motion for post-conviction relief, but in 
a decision issued in April 1988, the trial judge r ejected this 
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claim, along with all of Riley's other claims for post- 
conviction relief. Riley II, 1988 WL 47076, at *1. Reiterating 
the holding of the state supreme court, the trial judge 
wrote: "Because the asserted violation was not argued and 
evidence of such violation was not offer ed at the trial level, 
the defendant's contention is without merit." Id. 
 
Riley appealed the denial of post-conviction r elief to the 
Delaware Supreme Court and then successfully moved that 
court to remand the case for re-ar gument before the 
Superior Court. On remand, Riley presented his peremptory 
challenge argument to a new judge, Judge Steele, who took 
a different view of the issue. After noting the state supreme 
court's holding on direct appeal that Riley had not 
adequately raised the issue at trial, Judge Steele stated 
that he did not think that the state supreme court would 
reach the same decision in light of its later decision in 
Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682 (Del. 1986), in which the 
state supreme court had held that the defendant had made 
out a prima facie case. See Riley III, 1988 WL 47076, at *2. 
Judge Steele wrote that the defendant in Baynard had 
"objected to the exercise of each per emptory challenge 
against a black juror, noted the jur or's race for the record, 
moved the Court to refuse the challenges against two and 
moved to quash the entire panel." Id. Judge Steele then 
held that Riley's attorney had adequately raised an 
objection at trial and had made out a prima facie case. Id. 
at *3. Judge Steele therefore held that a hearing was 
needed for the purpose of determining the actual bases for 
the contested peremptories. After conducting such a 
hearing, Judge Steele found that the state had not 
exercised its peremptories based on race, and he denied 
Riley's Batson claim. Riley V. The Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed that decision. See Riley V, 585 A.2d at 725. 
 
2. When a state court rejects a criminal defe ndant's 
federal constitutional claim because the defendant did not 
raise the claim in accordance with an independent and 
adequate state procedural rule, a federal habeas court may 
not entertain the constitutional claim on the merits unless 
the habeas petitioner can show either (a) that ther e was 
"cause" for the procedural default and that it resulted in 
"prejudice" or (b) that the failur e to entertain the claim 
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would produce a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Here, as 
noted, one of the two alternative grounds given by the 
Delaware Supreme Court on direct appeal for rejecting 
Riley's claim that the prosecution had exer cised its 
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner 
was that Riley had not raised any such objection at trial. If 
the Delaware courts had adhered to this position, Riley's 
Batson claim would almost certainly be pr ocedurally 
barred. See Riley VI, 1998 WL 172856, at *14. 
 
"State procedural bars are not immortal, however; they 
may expire because of later actions by state courts. If the 
last state court to be presented with a particular federal 
claim reaches the merits, it removes any bar to federal- 
court review that might otherwise have been available." Ylst 
v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). Unfortunately, 
"[i]t is not always easy for a federal court to apply the 
independent and adequate state ground doctrine," Coleman, 
501 U.S. at 732, and this is such a case. While it is 
perfectly clear that Judge Steele rejected Riley's Batson 
claim on the merits, the decision of the Delawar e Supreme 
Court affirming Judge Steele's decision is less clear. The 
Delaware Supreme Court's discussion of the Batson issue 
in its entirety is as follows: 
 
       Riley's next contention, that the State exer cised its 
       peremptory challenges for racial reasons, we find to be 
       simply a renewed attempt to reopen pr eviously settled 
       issues. In Riley I, we set forth a legal analysis 
       functionally identical to the Supreme Court's analysis 
       later articulated in Batson. 476 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. at 
       1712, 90 L.Ed.2d at 69. In Riley I we found that Riley's 
       constitutional right to an impartial jury had not been 
       violated. 496 A.2d at 1009. The Superior Court, after 
       an evidentiary hearing on Riley's motion for 
       postconviction relief, held that Riley had not been 
       denied equal protection as a result of the State's use 
       of peremptory challenges. The court found that the 
       State had provided race-neutral explanations for its 
       peremptory challenges. We find no err or in Superior 
       Court's rejection of Riley's Batson claim. See Holland v. 
       Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 110 S.Ct. 803, 807, 107 L.Ed.2d 
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       905, 916 (1990) (the Sixth Amendment fair cr oss- 
       section requirement of an impartial jury does not 
       deprive a party of the right to exercise per emptory 
       challenges on racial or any other grounds fr om a venire 
       that otherwise meets Sixth Amendment cross-sectional 
       standards of representativeness). Mor eover, we reaffirm 
       our earlier decision sustaining the State's per emptory 
       challenges on state constitutional grounds. Riley I, 496 
       A.2d at 1010-1013. 
 
Riley V, 585 A.2d at 725. 
 
Riley interprets this passage as rejecting his claim on the 
merits, as Judge Steele had done. By contrast, the District 
Court held and the state now maintains, that the state 
supreme court reaffirmed its prior decision on direct 
appeal. Because one of the two alternative gr ounds for this 
former decision was procedural default, the District Court 
and the state interpret the state supreme court's later 
decision as reaffirming procedural default as a separate 
basis for its decision. 
 
We do not interpret the most recent decision of the 
Delaware Supreme Court as reaffir ming its prior holding of 
procedural default; instead, we interpr et it as rejecting 
Riley's claim on the merits. In the passage set out above, 
the court refers expressly to its holding on the merits of 
Riley's Batson claim and to the Superior Court's rejection of 
that claim on the merits. Moreover, in the final sentence of 
the passage, the court expressly reaffir ms its holding on 
direct appeal that the prosecution's use of peremptory 
challenges in this case did not violate the state 
constitution. The absence of any express r eference to the 
court's prior holding concerning procedural default, much 
less a specific reaffirmation of that holding, is suggestive. 
 
The only part of the passage that might be viewed as 
reaffirming the prior holding r egarding procedural default is 
the first sentence. But this sentence merely describes 
Riley's Batson argument as "a r enewed attempt to reopen 
previously settled issues." Riley V, 585 A.2d at 725. To say 
that the Batson issue was "previously settled" is quite 
different from saying that each of the two grounds for the 
previous decision is reaffirmed. Finally, if the state supreme 
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court continued to believe at the time of its most r ecent 
decision that Riley's Batson claim was for eclosed for failure 
to make a proper objection at the time of trial, it seems 
likely that the court would have made that point expressly 
and would not have relied on Judge Steele'sfindings. After 
all, if the holding on direct appeal remained operative, 
Judge Steele erred in refusing to follow that decision, and 
holding an evidentiary hearing. 
 
We view this case as similar to Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 
255 (1989). There, a state appellate court noted a rule of 
state law under which issues that could have been, but 
were not, raised on direct appeal wer e considered waived. 
See id. at 258. The state court also observed that certain 
issues could have been raised on direct appeal, but the 
court did not expressly state that it found the issues to 
have been waived, and it went on to reject them on the 
merits. Id. The United States Supreme Court interpreted 
the state court decision as one that appeared to rest 
primarily on federal law and thus presumed that there was 
no independent and adequate state ground for the decision. 
Id. at 261-63. See also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 734-40. We 
interpret the most recent decision of the Delaware Supreme 
Court in the same way and therefore view it as rejecting 
Riley's Batson claim on the merits. W e will therefore 
proceed to examine the merits of Riley's Batson argument. 
 
B. 
 
1. In Batson, the Supreme Court held that it is a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause for a prosecutor to 
strike a juror because of race. In order to raise a Batson 
claim, a defendant must attempt to make out a prima facie 
case. 476 U.S. at 96-97. If the defendant does so, the 
prosecutor must offer a race-neutral r eason for the strike, 
and the trial judge must make a factual finding on the 
question whether the strike was based on race. Id. at 97- 
98. 
 
In this case, the Superior Court found that Riley had 
made out a prima facie case. See Riley IV at *2, and the 
state does not dispute this point. The state of fered race- 
neutral justifications for his strikes, and the state courts 
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accepted those explanations. Id. at 3-6; Riley V, 585 A.2d 
at 725. Riley contends, however, that the state courts erred 
in finding that the strikes in question wer e not based on 
race. 
 
Under the version of the federal habeas statute that 
applies in this case, 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (1988 & Supp. 
1990) (amended 1996),2 the state courts' findings must be 
presumed to be correct unless one of eight exceptions was 
shown. Riley relies on two of these exceptions. He 
maintains that the presumption of correctness does not 
apply because he "did not receive a full, fair, and adequate 
hearing in the State court proceeding," and because the 
state court's "factual determination is not fairly supported 
by the record as a whole." 28 U.S.C.S 2254(d)(6)(8)(1988 & 
Supp. 1990). 
 
2. Riley contends that he did not receive"a full, fair, and 
adequate hearing in the State Court proceeding" because 
the state courts misinterpreted the federal constitutional 
standard. He points to Judge Steele's statement in Riley IV 
that the state was required to show that its peremptories 
were not based "solely on the ground of the jurors' race." 
Riley IV at 3. Riley argues that corr ect standard was set out 
in Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1993), where we 
said that "a violation of the Batson rule occurs when race 
is used as a factor in the exercise of a peremptory 
challenge." Id. at 972 (emphasis added). 
 
We reject this argument. When Judge Steele made the 
statement that Riley attacks, he was simply pr oviding a 
general description of the holding in Batson. He was not 
addressing the complicated issue of the pr ecise standard of 
causation that applies when a party contends that a 
peremptory challenge was based on an imper missible 
factor, e.g., whether a constitutional violation demands a 
finding that the impermissible factor was a motivating 
factor, a determinative factor, or the sole factor in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Riley's federal habeas petition was filed before the effective date of 
the 
current version of 28 U.S.C. S 2254, which was enacted as part of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214. 
Therefore, the prior version of S 2254 applies. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 
U.S. 320 (1997). 
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decision to exercise the strike. The language to which Riley 
objects is virtually identical to language in Batson itself, 
where the Supreme Court said that "the Equal Protection 
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors 
solely on account of their race." Batson , 476 U.S. at 89 
(emphasis added). This language was quoted in Jones, the 
decision on which Riley relies. Jones, 987 F.2d at 974. 
 
The statement that the prosecution must pr ove that its 
peremptories were not based solely on race is literally 
corrected as far as it goes: whether or not the prosecution 
must prove more, it most certainly must show that it did 
not strike potential jurors solely because of their race. 
Neither Judge Steele's statement nor the Supr eme Court's 
statement in Batson went on to explain whether the 
prosecution must show more than this (e.g., that race was 
not a but-for cause of the strikes), and it is a mistake to 
interpret them as addressing that question. 
 
In this case, we need not decide what is the corr ect 
standard of causation under Batson because, when Judge 
Steele's discussion of the Batson question is read in its 
entirety, it is apparent that he found that the real reason 
for each of the strikes had nothing to do with race. With 
respect to Charles McGuire, he accepted the state's 
explanation, which he found to be "entirely unrelated to 
race." Riley IV at 4-5. With r espect to Ray Nichols and Lois 
Beecher, he accepted the state's "race-neutral" 
explanations. Id. at 3-5. Thus, whatever the proper 
standard of causation for a Batson claim,3 we see no basis 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The standard of causation for a discrimination claim has been 
explored in depth in other contexts. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (Title VII);Watson v. SEPTA, 207 F.3d 207 
(3d Cir. 2000) (same); Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(en banc) (same). When a civil plaintiff seeks to recover for a 
constitutional violation, the plaintiff must initially show that an 
unconstitutional factor was a "motivating factor" in the decision. Mt. 
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
The defendant may then avoid liability by pr oving that the same decision 
would have been made even if the unconstitutional factor had not been 
considered. Id. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1985) 
(applying Mt. Healthy to a claim of racial discrimination). In the end, 
then, the standard is essentially but-for causation, and we are inclined 
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for holding that Riley was denied a full, fair , and adequate 
hearing. 
 
3. We turn, therefore, to R iley's argument that the 
findings of the state courts should not be pr esumed to be 
correct because they are not "fairly supported by the 
record." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(8) (1988 & Supp. 1990). Riley 
first advances several general reasons for concluding that 
the state court's findings are not fairly supported by the 
record. He then offers specific ar guments targeted at the 
findings regarding each of the potential jurors who was 
peremptorily challenged. We will begin by considering 
Riley's general arguments. 
 
a. Riley points to the conduct of the prosecu tor before 
the 1988 evidentiary hearing as evidence that race played 
a part in the peremptory challenges. Riley notes that the 
state offered no race neutral justifications for its strikes at 
the time of trial or on direct appeal, and he argues that this 
conduct is evidence that the strikes were racially motivated. 
 
These arguments have no merit. We see no reasonable 
basis for drawing any adverse inferences fr om the 
prosecution's failure to provide explanations for its strikes 
at the time of trial. At no time during the trial did Riley 
argue that the prosecution's peremptory challenges were 
racially motivated. Riley moved to have the entir e jury panel 
disqualified before any challenges wer e used. Then, after 
failing to object while the challenges were being exercised, 
Riley's attorney made a motion that he characterized as 
"something of a renewal of [his] earlier motion" and again 
requested dismissal of the entire panel. Furthermore, 
Riley's trial occurred four years befor e Batson was decided 
and two years before the Delaware Supr eme Court (in 
Riley's own appeal) adopted a similar rule as a matter of 
state law. In light of the nature of the motions made by 
Riley's trial counsel and the status of the law at the time of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to think that this is the proper standar d under Batson. This would mean 
that a peremptory challenge is unconstitutional if, and only if, the 
lawyer 
would not have made it but for the potential jur or's race, sex, etc. 
Here, 
however, because of the reasons explained in text, we do not find it 
necessary to resolve this question. 
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the trial, no adverse inferences can be drawn from the 
prosecution's failure to offer explanations for its strikes. 
 
The same is true with respect to the brief that the state 
filed in Riley's direct appeal to the state supreme court. 
Riley makes much of the fact that the state, r elying on 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), ar gued in its brief 
that the use of individual peremptory challenges to strike 
potential jurors based on race was not unconstitutional. 
Riley states: 
 
       [I]n its first opportunity to defend in writing its 
       peremptory strikes of Black jurors, the State did not 
       even try to offer any race-neutral basis for its strikes 
       (not even the implausible post hoc rationales it 
       conjured up many years later in the 1989 state court 
       Batson proceedings) -- not even as an alternative 
       factual argument. Instead the State ar gued for 13 
       pages that there was nothing wrong with using 
       peremptory strikes to exclude Black jur ors on the basis 
       of race-based "group association" and"predisposition." 
       . . . . The implication is clear: In the State's 1984 view, 
       "group association" was a perfectly appropriate and 
       even desirable basis for peremptory strikes. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 23-24 (emphasis in original). 
 
This argument is not well taken. No adverse inferences 
can reasonably be drawn from the state's r eliance on the 
rule of constitutional law accepted in Swain, which was 
then the governing Supreme Court decision. Nor can any 
adverse inferences be reasonably drawn fr om the state's 
failure to offer race-neutral explanations in its appellate 
brief. The state's brief specifically denied that its 
peremptories were based on race. See  App. 896. 
Furthermore, since there was no evidence in the record 
regarding the reasons for the strikes, the state could hardly 
have expected the state supreme court to base a decision 
on explanations provided without recor d support in a brief. 
 
Riley contends that statistics concerning the use of 
peremptory challenges by the Kent County Pr osecutor's 
office fatally undermine the state court'sfindings with 
respect to the reasons for the strikes at issue in his case. 
In his brief, Riley states: "At the state court Batson hearing, 
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Mr. Riley introduced summary evidence that in four 
Delaware first degree murder trials occurring in Kent 
County within one year of Mr. Riley's trial, every prospective 
Black and minority juror called was per emptorily struck by 
the prosecution." Appellant's Br. at 33. We found this 
assertion troubling and requested post-ar gument 
submissions related to it. However, after examination, we 
do not find the supporting evidence on which Riley relies to 
be helpful. 
 
The four first-degree murder trials to which Riley referred 
were his own and those of Andre Deputy, an African 
American, and two whites, Daniel Pregent, who was 
acquitted,4 and Judith McBride, who was convicted. See 
Dec. 16, 1999, Letter to Court from Thomas J. Allingham II, 
Appendix A (hereinafter "Appendix A"). W ith respect to 
these cases, no information has been pr ovided about the 
racial makeup of the venire, the identities of the 
prosecutors who participated in jury selection, or 
peremptories exercised by the defense. 
 
In the trial of Andre Deputy, the state struck four whites, 
one African American, and one person listed as "Indian." 
Appendix A. Deputy argued that the prosecution's 
peremptory challenge of the African American venireperson 
violated Batson. See Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1492 
(3d Cir. 1994). Deputy's Batson ar gument was rejected in 
the district court decision denying his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus and on appeal. See id. at 1492. Since it has 
been held that no Batson violation was shown in Deputy, 
that case hardly supports Riley's argument here. 
 
In Pregent's case, the state struck four whites and one 
black. There is nothing before us to indicate that any 
Batson objection was made, and it is doubtful that the 
pattern of strikes exercised by the pr osecution sufficed to 
make out a prima facie case. 
 
The remaining case is the prosecution of Judith McBride 
for murdering her husband. See McBride v. State, 477 A.2d 
174 (Del. 1984). The state exercised a total of 10 strikes, of 
which three were against potential jur ors identified as black.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3, 5 (Del. 1987). 
5. According to Riley's statistics, five of those struck by the state were 
white, and the race of two is not provided. Appendix A. 
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Appendix A. There is nothing to indicate that any Batson 
objection was made. Without in effect holding a Batson 
hearing, there is no way of determining whether any 
prosecution peremptories were based on race. 
 
We have given careful consideration to the statistics that 
Riley has presented, but we believe that it would be 
analytically unsound to give those statistics any weight. 
The dissent, however, makes much of this data. Indeed, the 
dissent goes so far as to assert that "the most plausible . . . 
inference to be drawn from the data is that the Kent 
County Prosecutor followed a pattern of using peremptory 
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner ." Dissent at 
63. This conclusion is completely unwarranted. 
 
According to the data supplied to us, the pr osecutors in 
these cases exercised peremptory challenges against 25 
potential jurors identified as white and eight identified as 
black. Thus, 24% of these peremptories wer e exercised 
against African Americans. Because we do not know the 
racial composition of the venires, we cannot even be sure 
that the number of African Americans peremptorily 
challenged by the prosecutors was dispr oportionally high. 
 
We note that, according to the most r ecent census at the 
time of Riley's trial, the population of Kent County was 
18 % black. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY 
DATA BOOK -- 1983 at 74. If the potential jurors 
peremptorily challenged by the prosecutors had been 
proportional to the racial makeup of the county, the 
prosecutors would have stricken six African Americans, 
rather than eight. Even if it is assumed that the Kent 
County prosecutors followed the same jury selection 
strategy in all four cases,6 the introduction of a single 
additional variable -- or pure chance -- could easily explain 
the data. We need not consider what weight should be given 
to a professional multiple-regression analysis of peremptory 
challenge statistics in determining whether a Batson 
violation occurred in a particular case. Cf. McClesky v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. There is no evidence that this was done. First, there is no evidence 
that the same prosecutors appeared in all four cases, and particularly in 
view of the differences in the four cases, there is no reason to suppose 
that the same strategies were used. 
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Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)(multiple-regr ession analysis of 
state's death penalty statistics insufficient to show that 
particular petitioner suffered discrimination). We are not 
presented here with anything that even r emotely 
approaches expert statistical evidence. 
 
Characterizing Riley's data as merely "imper fect," the 
dissent argues that an adverse inference should be drawn 
against the state for failing to come forwar d with additional 
information. We see no basis for this approach. First, as we 
have explained, Riley's data did not raise an infer ence of 
discrimination, and thus additional data wer e not needed to 
refute Riley's statistical showing. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 
296-97 ("[A]bsent far stronger pr oof, it is not necessary to 
seek a rebuttal."). Second, the state was never given notice 
that it had any obligation to provide additional data. As we 
read the record, the state mer ely asked for the opportunity 
to provide additional information and then elected not to do 
so. There are obviously many reasons why the state might 
have made that choice, and we see no basis for speculating 
that it did so because any additional information would 
have been unfavorable to its position. Third and most 
important, the information that is most critically lacking -- 
the prosecutors' reasons for striking thefive African 
American venire members in the Deputy, McBride, and 
Pregent cases -- probably could not be obtained without in 
effect conducting retrospective Batson hearings in those 
cases. We know of no precedent for such a practice -- 
holding a Batson hearing regarding peremptory challenges 
exercised by prosecutors in other cases in which no claim 
of discrimination may have been made. For all these 
reasons, we do not find the statistics r egarding peremptory 
challenges exercised by prosecutors in Kent Count in other 
cases to be probative. 
 
b. We come, now, to Riley's argument that the evidence 
in the record concerning the thr ee contested peremptories 
does not fairly support the state court's findings that these 
strikes were not based on race. 
 
Ray Nichols Ray Nichols was the first black juror 
challenged by the prosecution. The prosecutor testified that 
he struck Nichols because he was uncertain that Nichols 
would be able to vote for a death sentence. See  App. 797- 
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99. According to the prosecutor's testimony, "there was a 
pause and a significant pause in him answering Judge 
Bush's inquiry and that to me was enough to suggest that 
he might not be able to return a death penalty and I didn't 
want anyone that wasn't going to give me a death penalty." 
Id. Having heard the prosecutor's testimony, Judge Steele 
concluded: "I find the State provided a cr edible, race- 
neutral reason for exercising its per emptory challenge after 
appraising the demeanor and credibility of the juror. The 
State's exercise of its peremptory challenge was non- 
discriminatory. I am satisfied that the per emptory challenge 
was not made on the ground of the juror's race." Id. at 889. 
 
Riley suggests that it is not believable that the pr osecutor 
was able to remember at the time of the evidentiary hearing 
in 1988 that Nichols had paused while answering a 
question during voir dire six years earlier . In addition, the 
dissent contrasts the prosecutor's ability to r emember this 
pause with his inability to remember another potentially 
significant aspect of the jury selection pr ocess,7 and the 
dissent notes that the prosecutor was a friend and neighbor 
of the victim. Dissent at 59. These facts wer e highlighted 
during the cross-examination of the prosecutor at the 
Batson hearing, see App. at 820-29, and they wer e 
important factors to be considered in assessing the 
prosecutor's credibility. Judge Steele was aware of these 
facts and had the opportunity to observe the pr osecutor 
testify on the witness stand. Judge Steele found that the 
prosecutor's testimony was credible. 
 
Our standard of review of Judge Steele'sfinding is 
narrow. Under 28 U.S.C. S2254(d)(8)(1988 & Supp. 1990), 
we must accept any state court factual finding that is "fairly 
supported by the record," and in this instance, because 
Judge Steele's finding was based squarely on an 
assessment of the credibility of a witness who appeared and 
testified before him, we must exercise special caution.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See Dissent at 66-67 (discussing jur or Reed). We discuss this matter 
infra at 23-25. 
 
8. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 353 (1991); Batson, 476 
U.S. at 98 n.21. In discussing a federal appellate court's standard of 
review in a direct federal appeal, the Supreme Court observed: "When 
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Under the very limited scope of review af forded by 28 
U.S.C. S2254(d)(8)(1988 & Supp. 1990), we cannot overturn 
Judge Steele's credibility determination. 9 
 
Lois Beecher During voir dire, Lois Beecher initially gave 
an answer that seemed to indicate a willingness to impose 
the death penalty in an appropriate case.10 When 
(Text continued on page 21) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
findings are based on determinations r egarding the credibility of 
witnesses," an appellate court must give "even greater deference to the 
trial court's findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the 
variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the 
listener's . . . belief in what is said." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 
U.S. 
564, 575 (1985). Indeed, the Court added, that "when a trial judge's 
finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of [a] witness[ ] 
[who] has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not 
contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally 
inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error." Id. "The respectpaid 
such findings in a habeas proceeding certainly should be no less." Patton 
v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984). 
9. Our dissenting colleague, by contrast, wouldfind on the cold record 
before us that the prosecutor was untruthful when he testified before 
Judge Steele. In fact, a centerpiece of the dissent is an attack upon the 
credibility of prosecutor James Liguori. W e reject the dissent's analysis 
of this issue and note that some of the facts on which the dissent relies 
are either insignificant or irrelevant. For example, the dissent 
repeatedly 
implies that Liguori's testimony is suspect because he testified at the 
Batson hearing that his objective at Riley's trial was to obtain a capital 
sentence. See Dissent at 60-61, 64. But is not this the objective of every 
prosecutor in a case in which the death penalty is sought? Are all such 
prosecutors presumptively unworthy of belief? The dissent also implies 
that Liguori discriminated in the use of per emptory challenges because 
an appellate brief on which his name does not even appear (see App. at 
894) relied in part on Swain, which was then still good law. See Dissent 
at 59-60. The dissent points out that the recor d does not reflect any 
"uncertainty on Nichols's part" as to whether he could return a death 
sentence. Dissent at 64. But what the prosecutor claimed to have 
observed -- "a significant pause" -- is not something that a transcript is 
likely to capture. Likewise, the fact that the prosecutor did not have 
"contemporaneous notes" (see Dissent at 58) r egarding the pause reveals 
little, because, particularly in the pre-Batson era, a prosecutor had no 
strong reason for making or keeping such notes. The dissent's 
arguments do not persuade us to overtur n Judge Steele's credibility 
finding. 
10. The entire relevant colloquy was as follows: 
 
Q. Let me ask you several questions dealing with capital punishment, 
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your attitude towards capital punishment. Do you have any 
conscientious scruples against finding a ver dict of guilty where the 
punishment might be death or against imposing the death penalty if the 
evidence should so warrant? 
 
A. Can I rephrase that in my own wor ds? 
 
Q. Yes, you may. 
 
A. If a person did something that was wrong and that was his 
punishment, then I would agree, you know. T o me it is okay if you done 
something wrong without, you know -- if you didn't have -- 
 
Q. If the evidence justified it, you couldfind a person guilty even 
though the punishment may be death? 
 
A. Yes, I could. 
 
Q. Or the penalty may be imposing the death penalty. Regardless of 
any personal beliefs or feelings you may have, if the evidence justified 
it, 
would you be able to find a person guilty of mur der in the first degree 
and would you be able to impose the death penalty? I will repeat the 
question. 
 
Regardless of any personal feelings or beliefs you may have, if the 
evidence in the case justified it, would you be able to find a person 
guilty 
of murder in the first degree and would you be able to impose the death 
penalty? 
 
A. I've got to say this. I may, could say that I agree, but I don't know 
whether I could say, you know -- I don't know whether I could draw the 
conclusion. 
 
Q. If the evidence justified it, do you feel your personal feelings 
against the death penalty may be such that you may not find this person 
guilty of murder in the first degree? 
 
A. I couldn't put my personal feelings in it. 
 
Q. Pardon? 
 
A. I couldn't put my personal -- 
 
Q. You would not? 
 
A. No, I couldn't put my personal feelings in it. 
 
Q. What would prevent you from finding this person guilty of murder 
in the first degree and imposing the death penalty then? Do you have 
some conscientious scruples against finding a person guilty? 
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questioned further, however, she said that the questioning 
was "making [her] think about it," and she ultimately said 
that she did not believe that she could impose the death 
penalty. App. 290-92. The state then peremptorily 
challenged her. See id. at 292. The prosecutor later testified 
that he struck Beecher because of her unwillingness to 
impose the death penalty and because she seemed 
confused during the voir dire. See id. at 803-05. Judge 
Steele accepted this explanation and found that the strike 
was not based on race. Riley IV at 5. 
 
Riley argues that the state court finding is not fairly 
supported by the record because Beecher's initial responses 
in the colloquy indicated a willingness to impose the death 
penalty if the evidence warranted. The fact r emains, 
however, that Beecher ultimately said that she could not 
vote for a death sentence. In light of that admission, the 
prosecutor could have reasonably viewed her attitude as 
troubling. We hold that the state courtfinding is fairly 
supported by the record. 
 
Charles McGuire Riley's strongest Batson claim concerns 
the prosecution's strike of Charles McGuir e. At trial, the 
prosecutor first used a peremptory challenge against 
McGuire and then immediately made the following 
application to the trial judge: 
 
        [THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor , may I ask the 
       Court to reconsider charging the State for that strike. 
       This Mr. McGuire came to chambers yester day and 
       expressed his belief that he didn't know if he could last 
       the two weeks [the estimated length of the trial], there 
       was some problem with work. He was an inspector or 
       something for the Department of Labor. I know he 
       came in yesterday. 
 
        THE COURT: I will not strike him for cause for that 
       reason. He asked to be excused yesterday and I 
       decided not to excuse him. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       A. No. I just never had to do that and it's just making me think 
       about it. 
 
App. 290-92 (emphasis added). 
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App. 250. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing held before Judge Steele as 
part of the post-conviction relief proceeding, the prosecutor 
testified that he struck McGuire because McGuire "had 
previously requested to be excused fr om jury service" and 
because the prosecutor "wanted attentive jur ors" who were 
not worried about missing other obligations or activities 
while the trial took place. App. 801. 
 
The defense called McGuire as a witness at the 
evidentiary hearing. McGuire testified that he was employed 
by the State of Delaware as a Social Security"disability 
adjudicator," App. 846-47; that he had been reporting for 
jury duty in the courthouse in Dover for two to thr ee weeks 
before he was questioned in connection with the Riley case 
but had not been seated on a jury, id. at 852-53; that while 
he was away from work, the disability claims assigned to 
him would "just sit[ ]," id. at 850; that the director of his 
office had told him that he was going to make a"formal 
request" that McGuire be excused, id. at 860; that such a 
request was sent, id. at 853, 856; and that the request had 
been discussed in chambers with the judge. Id . at 849-50, 
856. McGuire said, however, that he himself had never 
expressed an unwillingness to serve on the jury and had 
been willing to do so. See id. at 850. 
 
Judge Steele accepted the prosecutor's explanation of the 
reason for striking McGuire. Judge Steele wrote: 
 
       McGuire's employer sent a letter requesting he be 
       released from jury duty because he could not be 
       replaced at his job if he was chosen for jury duty. The 
       letter by McGuire's employer clearly gave the State 
       reason to question whether McGuire would give his full 
       time and attention to the trial and whether he would 
       be able to serve for the entirety of the time projected 
       for the trial. Whether McGuire, in fact, did not request 
       relief from jury duty and did wish to serve is of no 
       consequence. 
 
Riley IV at 4-5. Judge Steele then cr edited the state's 
explanation of the reason for striking McGuir e, terming it 
"clear, reasonably specific and entirely unrelated to the 
juror's race." Id. at 5. 
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Several factors provide substantial support for this 
finding. It is apparent that McGuire's work situation was on 
the prosecutor's minds when McGuire was peremptorily 
challenged because, as noted, immediately after striking 
McGuire, the prosecutor asked that McGuir e's dismissal be 
deemed for cause since he had "expressed his belief that he 
didn't know if he could last the two weeks." App. 250. In 
addition, a reasonable prosecutor might well have wondered 
whether McGuire's work situation would adversely affect 
his attentiveness at trial. As noted, McGuir e's supervisor 
had made a "formal request" that he be excused "because 
he could not be replaced at his job if he was chosen for jury 
duty."11 Whether or not McGuire himself in fact wished to 
serve on the jury, the impression appar ently was conveyed 
that McGuire wanted to be excused and to r eturn to work, 
since the trial judge commented: "He asked to be excused 
yesterday and I decided not to excuse him." See App. 250. 
Under these circumstances, a reasonable pr osecutor could 
have been concerned that McGuire might have been 
inattentive at trial due to worry about missing work, leaving 
his duties unattended, and perhaps incurring his 
supervisor's displeasure. 
 
Riley attacks Judge Steele's finding on two gr ounds. 
First, he points out that, according to McGuir e's testimony 
at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, McGuire 
himself did not ask to be excused. This argument is 
unpersuasive. Although McGuire testified that he did not 
ask to be excused, the trial judge, as noted, stated at the 
time of McGuire's dismissal: "He asked to be excused 
yesterday and I decided not to excuse him." App. 250 
(emphasis added). Thus, McGuire, who was unable to 
remember many details at the time of the post-conviction 
relief evidentiary hearing, see App. 853, 857-62, may have 
been mistaken, or he may have conveyed the impr ession at 
the time of trial that he personally wanted to be excused. 
 
Second, Riley points out that a handwritten sheet 
prepared by the prosecutors during voir dire contains the 
following notation next to the name of a white jur or, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Riley IV at 4. See also App. 860 (McGuire's testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing). 
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Charles Reed, whom the prosecution did not per emptorily 
strike: "works Lowe's, wants off." App. 823. One of the 
prosecutors was questioned about this notation by Riley's 
attorney at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, 
but the prosecutor testified that he had no r ecollection of 
Reed. See id. at 823-24. 
 
The notation by Reed's name and the prosecutor's 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing are certainly factors 
that Judge Steele could have viewed as tending to 
undermine the credibility of the pr osecutor's explanation 
for striking McGuire, but the notation and the prosecutor's 
testimony are insufficient to show that Judge Steele's 
finding is not "fairly supported by the r ecord." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(d). It is reasonable to infer fr om the notation "wants 
off " that, at some point in the jury selection process, Reed 
expressed a desire to be excused for some reason. As far as 
we are aware, however, the record does not reveal why12 or 
how strongly Reed wanted to be excused. The transcript of 
the voir dire on December 6 and 7, 1982, shows that, at the 
final stage of the jury selection process, the members of the 
venire were asked whether there was"any reason why 
[they] absolutely [could not] serve," App. 223, that members 
of the venire then successfully asked to be r eleased for 
reasons such as a previously planned vacation, id. at 253, 
but that Reed made no request to be excused at that time. 
See id. at 229-30. Thus, as far as the r ecord appears to 
reveal, Reed may have had a relatively weak desire and 
reason to be excused, and his situation may not have been 
at all comparable in this respect to McGuir e's.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Just because the notation "wants of f " appear after the words "works 
at Lowe's," it cannot be assumed that Reed's desire to be excused was 
related to his employment. 
 
13. Many decisions have held that Batson is not contravened simply 
because two jurors exhibit similar characteristics and one is excluded 
while the other is retained. See, e.g., Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 
918 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1255 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 926 (11th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Alvarado, 951 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir . 1988); United States v. McCoy, 
848 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415, 
417 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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Our scope of review of Judge Steele's finding is narrow. 
Judge's Steele's finding "on the ultimate question of 
discriminatory intent" is entitled to "gr eat deference," 
particularly because such findings "lar gely turn on an 
evaluation of credibility." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 
352, 353 (1991). See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 
("Since the trial judge's findings in [this] context . . . largely 
will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court 
ordinarily should give those findings gr eat deference."). 
Here, although it would be satisfying to know why Reed 
was not stricken, that unanswered question is not enough, 
in view of the "great deference" owed Judge Steele's 
credibility determination, to demonstrate that Judge's 
Steele's finding is not "fairly supported by the record."14 
 
III. 
 
Riley next argues that adverse publicity pr evented him 
from obtaining a trial by an impartial jury. He contends, 
first, that it should be presumed that he was prejudiced by 
pretrial publicity because the recor d establishes the 
existence of a "hostile trial atmosphere" and, second, that 
the record shows that several jurors were unable to be 
impartial due to exposure to unfavorable pr etrial publicity. 
 
A. 
 
"Where media or other community reaction to a crime or 
a defendant engenders an atmosphere so hostile and 
pervasive as to preclude a rational trial pr ocess, a court 
reviewing for constitutional error will pr esume prejudice to 
the defendant without reference to an examination of the 
attitudes of those who served as the defendant's jur ors." 
Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d 1237, 1252 (3d Cir. 1992). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. This case is very different from Jones v. Ryan, supra, on which Riley 
relies. There, exercising plenary r eview in the absence of any findings 
of 
fact by a state court, we held that Batson was violated where the 
prosecutor excluded a black juror who had a child approximately the 
same age as the defendant, while retaining a white juror who was 
similarly situated. Jones, 987 F.2d at 973. In the present case, we are 
limited to deciding whether the state court finding is fairly supported by 
the evidence. 
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See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes 
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 
U.S. 723 (1963); Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736, 755 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (en banc). "The community and media reaction, 
however, must have been so hostile and so pervasive as to 
make it apparent that even the most car eful voir dire 
process would be unable to assure an impartial jury. . . . 
Such cases are exceedingly rare." Rock, 959 F.2d at 1252- 
53. 
 
In this case, the state courts made a finding of 
impartiality. Such a finding is entitled to defer ence, see 
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 & n. 7 (1984), and we 
find no basis for overturning that finding. 
 
Riley relies on a relatively small number of newspaper 
articles, almost half of which appeared six months or more 
before the trial. Although two of the articles named Riley as 
a suspect in Feeley's murder, and although a few of the 
articles discussed the plight of the Feeley childr en, who 
were orphaned by the murder, the articles were not 
inflammatory. In short, the media coverage was not"so 
hostile and pervasive as to preclude a rational trial 
process." Rock, 959 F.2d at 1252. 
 
B. 
 
Because Riley has not shown the presence of 
circumstances justifying a presumption of prejudice, he 
"must establish that those who actually served on his jury 
lacked a capacity to reach a fair and impartial verdict based 
solely on the evidence they heard in the courtr oom." Rock, 
959 F.2d at 1253. See also Patton, 467 U.S. at 1035; Irvin 
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). "The fact that jury 
members may have been exposed to press r eports or other 
community reaction concerning the case and even the fact 
that they may have formed a tentative opinion based on 
that exposure will not establish a constitutional violation if 
the trial court has found, with record support, that each of 
the jurors was able to put aside extrinsic influences." Rock, 
959 F.2d at 1253. 
 
Riley contends that two jurors, Leon Morris and Carl 
Patterson, were unable to be impartial due to exposure to 
pretrial publicity. We do not agr ee. 
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Morris testified during voir dire that he"had read 
something about" the case in the newspaper at the time of 
the murder and that he had heard on the radio that the 
case was "coming to trial." App. 277. The following 
exchange then occurred: 
 
        Q. . . . Because of what you read in the newspaper, 
       do you feel that you could sit here as an impartial 
       jury? 
 
        A. Yes, because I know nothing of the e vidence or 
       anything else. 
 
App. 278. 
 
Carl Patterson during voir dire was asked whether 
anything he had read in the newspaper had cr eated bias or 
prejudice against the defendant. See App. 294 He 
responded that he could not remember a lot of what he 
read in the newspaper. See id. The following colloquy then 
occurred: 
 
        Q. Then do you know of any reason why you  can't 
       render an impartial verdict based solely upon the law 
       and the evidence? 
 
        A. No, Your Honor. 
 
Id. 
 
The trial judge implicitly found that these jur ors were 
impartial, and the Delaware Supreme Court agreed on 
direct appeal. Such implicit findings ar e entitled to a 
presumption of correctness. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35 
(1992); Weeks v. Snyder, 2000 WL 975043 (3d Cir. July 17, 
2000); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F .3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 
2000), and we see no ground for holding that that 
presumption has been overcome. 
 
IV. 
 
Riley argues that the prosecution violated his right to due 
process by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence in its 
possession as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court held that "the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
 
                                27 
  
accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution." Id. at 87. To state a valid Brady claim, a 
plaintiff must show that the evidence was (1) suppressed, 
(2) favorable, and (3) material to the defense. See United 
States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome would have been different had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense. See United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). Evidence that may be used to 
impeach may qualify as Brady material. See Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 445 (1995); Bagley , 473 U.S. at 676. 
 
Riley's Brady argument concerns a wiretap on the 
telephone of the mother of Tyrone Baxter . Before trial, 
Riley's lawyer asked the state to produce r ecordings or 
transcripts of the intercepted calls, but the state refused, 
arguing that the tapes contained no exculpatory material. 
Without listening to the tape himself, the trial judge 
accepted the prosecutor's representation and denied Riley's 
motion for production. Throughout the subsequent 
proceedings in state and federal court, no judge listened to 
the tapes. 
 
In his briefs in this appeal, Riley made a str ong Brady 
argument. He asserted that between the time of the Feeley 
murder and Baxter's arrest, "Baxter spoke to his mother on 
the telephone on several occasions"; that "Baxter's 
testimony was the State's strongest evidence against" him; 
and that statements made by Baxter to his mother might 
have provided valuable impeachment evidence. Appellant's 
Br. at 5. At a minimum, he contended, the state courts or 
the District Court should have listened to the tapes in 
camera to determine whether they contained Brady 
material. 
 
At oral argument, however, counsel for the appellees 
represented that an examination of the logs of the wiretap 
on Mrs. Baxter's telephone did not reveal any intercepted 
conversations in which Baxter participated. Copies of the 
logs were provided to Riley's attor neys and to the court, 
and Riley's attorneys submitted a letter -brief commenting 
on the contents of the logs. We have examined the logs, and 
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it appears that the state's representation is correct: we see 
no record of any conversations in which Baxter 
participated. The revelation that the logs do not mention 
any such conversations fatally undermines the Brady 
argument made in Riley's briefs. 
 
In their post-argument letter-brief commenting on the 
logs, Riley's attorneys advance differ ent arguments to show 
that an in camera inspection of the wiretap r ecordings is 
required. A defendant seeking an in camera inspection to 
determine whether files contain Brady  material must at 
least make a "plausible showing" that the inspection will 
reveal material evidence. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 
39, 58 n.15 (1987) (quoting United States v. V alenzuela- 
Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)). Mer e speculation is not 
enough. United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 631 (7th 
Cir. 1984). The arguments made by Riley's attorneys in 
their post-argument submission do not satisfy this 
standard. 
 
Riley's attorneys first note that several log entries 
"expressly refer to conversations about Tyrone Baxter." 
12/16/99 Letter-brief at 3 (emphasis added). But it is 
unlikely that statements "about" Baxter by third persons -- 
unlike statements made by Baxter himself -- could have 
been used to impeach Baxter's testimony or could have 
been admitted at trial on some other ground. For that 
reason alone, it is unlikely that these statements are 
material. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1995). 
Moreover, even if the problem of admissibility is put aside, 
it is pure speculation to suppose that the contents of the 
statements are in any way exculpatory. 
 
Riley's attorneys also suggest that conversations between 
Baxter and his mother may have been intercepted and 
recorded but that the person or persons who compiled the 
logs may not have recognized Baxter's voice. This, however, 
is nothing but the purest speculation. W e note that the 
wiretap occurred while the police wer e seeking to arrest 
Baxter; they therefore had a strong incentive to identify him 
if he participated in any of the intercepted conversations. 
We have considered all of Riley's Brady arguments and find 
them to be without merit. 
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V. 
 
Riley argues that he was denied the ef fective assistance 
of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial.15 The District 
Court held that many of Riley's arguments concerning the 
alleged deficiencies of his attorney's per formance were 
never presented to the Delaware Supr eme Court and were 
thus procedurally barred, and the District Court rejected 
Riley's remaining arguments regar ding this matter on the 
merits. On appeal, Riley attacks both parts of the District 
Court's holding. 
 
A. 
 
Riley contends that the District Court was r equired to 
hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of pr ocedural 
default for two reasons. First, he maintains that at least 
some of the arguments that the District Court held were 
procedurally barred might have been pr esented to the 
Delaware Supreme Court during the oral ar gument of his 
direct appeal even though those arguments were not 
contained in his brief. Because the recor d does not include 
a transcript of the oral argument, Riley maintains that the 
District Court should have held an evidentiary hearing for 
the purpose of reconstructing the recor d. See Appellant's 
Br. at 38-39. We disagree. 
 
On direct appeal, Riley was represented by the same 
attorney who had represented him at trial. In his amended 
habeas petition, Riley acknowledges that no inef fective 
assistance argument was made in the dir ect appeal brief 
that was ultimately submitted on his behalf and accepted 
for filing by the Delaware Supreme Court.16 See App. 1198. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Riley's amended federal habeas petition raised claims regarding the 
alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel at the guilty phase, but the 
District Court held that these claims were pr ocedurally barred. See Riley 
VI, 1998 WL 172856, at **18-20. On appeal, Riley refers to these claims 
in a footnote. See Appellant's Br. at 38 n.16. This footnote is inadequate 
to raise the issue on appeal. 
16. The first brief submitted by Riley's attor ney on direct appeal 
contained a conclusory passage that purported to raise the issue of 
ineffective assistance (without any factual elaboration) for the purpose 
of 
preserving the issue. See App. 1198. However, this brief was rejected by 
the Delaware Supreme Court, and the brief that was ultimately 
submitted and accepted contained no such passage. See App. 1198-99. 
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In addition, the opinion issued by the Delawar e Supreme 
Court in the direct appeal makes no mention of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See Riley I. Under these 
circumstances, the District Court was certainly not 
required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether the attorney who represented Riley at trial chose at 
oral argument before the state supr eme court to make 
arguments not mentioned in his brief and to condemn his 
own performance in the trial court. 
 
With little elaboration, Riley also contends that the 
District Court should have held an evidentiary hearing so 
that Riley could show that he had "cause" for not raising 
the arguments in question in state court. See Appellant's 
Br. at 39. However, Riley has not even identified any 
"cause" that he would have attempted to show. We will not 
reverse the decision of the District Court and order that 
Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing so that Riley can 
develop the factual predicate for a "cause" that Riley has 
not even disclosed. 
 
Perhaps the most frequently asserted"cause" for 
procedural default is ineffective assistance of counsel, and 
we will therefore comment briefly on the steps that Riley 
should have taken if he wished to rely on this"cause." As 
the District Court pointed out, in order for Riley to show 
that ineffective assistance provided"cause" for failing to 
raise the arguments in question in the state court 
proceedings, Riley would have to show that the new 
attorney who represented him in the state post-conviction 
relief proceedings was ineffective. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 50 & 
n.16, 56-57. This is so because Delaware per mits a claim 
of ineffective assistance to be raised in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding even if it was not raised on direct appeal. 
See Riley VI, 1998 WL 172856, at **17-18 & n.16. 17 
 
Riley has not argued, however, that the attorney who 
represented him in the state post-conviction relief 
proceedings provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Indeed, in Riley's case, ineffective assistance was vigorously argued 
in the post-conviction relief proceedings, and the Delaware Supreme 
Court addressed these arguments on the merits. See Riley V, 585 A.2d 
at 726-29. 
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make the specific arguments that the District Court held 
were procedurally barred.18  Moreover, because Riley never 
raised a claim in state court that his post-conviction relief 
attorney was ineffective, he runs afoul of the rule that "a 
petitioner must demonstrate independent cause and 
prejudice excusing the default of the inef fectiveness claim 
before that claim can be assessed as cause in r elation to a 
second, substantive claim." Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015, 
1030 (11th Cir. 1996). See also Justus v. Murray, 897 F.2d 
709, 713 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 
B. 
 
We will now discuss the ineffective assistance arguments 
that were not procedurally defaulted. In order to show that 
his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel was 
violated at the penalty phase, Riley must satisfy the two- 
pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). First, he must demonstrate that his attor ney "made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
`counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Id. at 687. "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's 
performance must be highly defer ential. It is all too 
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's 
assistance after . . . [an] adverse sentence, and it is all too 
easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has 
proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or 
omission of counsel was unreasonable." Id. at 689. Second, 
if counsel's representation is shown to fall outside "the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance," id., it must be 
shown that "the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense," that is, that "there is a r easonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional err ors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been differ ent." Id. at 694. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Even if Riley had asserted a "cause" for the procedural default, he 
would have to confront the rule that a habeas petitioner is not entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing in federal court to establish a factual record 
unless the petitioner can show "cause" for not making the necessary 
factual record in the state proceedings. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 
504 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992). 
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1. In his brief in our court, Riley presented  a greatly 
truncated version of arguments previously advanced 
regarding trial counsel's failure to call certain family 
members to testify at the penalty phase of the trial and trial 
counsel's failure to locate or contact other family members 
who might have testified. All of these family members, Riley 
argues, could have provided evidence about his traumatic 
experiences as a child and his "severely dysfunctional 
family." Appellant's Br. at 41. 
 
The Superior Court, the Delaware Supreme Court, and 
the District Court all addressed these ar guments in some 
detail and rejected them. They concluded that Riley's trial 
attorney made reasonable efforts tofind certain family 
members who could not be located, that he did not act 
unreasonably in failing to call others as witnesses, and that 
his failure to rely on what was ter med Riley's "social 
history" represented a reasonable strategy. See Riley II, 
1988 WL 47076 at *3-4, *7-9; Riley V, 585 A.2d at 726-28; 
Riley VI, 1998 WL 172856, at **20-23. 
 
In his brief in our court, Riley merely states without 
elaboration that "trial counsel failed to call as witnesses 
members of Mr. Riley's immediate family, several of whom 
lived with a few hours of Dover, Delawar e" and that these 
witnesses could have testified about his childhood and 
family. Appellant's Br. at 41. He provides no response to 
the detailed reasons given by the state courts and the 
District Court for holding that trial counsel was not 
ineffective in failing to call or locate family members for the 
purpose of eliciting testimony about Riley's childhood and 
family. 
 
Nothing has been presented that convinces us that the 
state courts and the District Court erred. W e agree with the 
state courts and the District Court that Riley has not 
shown that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call 
those family members who could be located, such as Riley's 
mother. The District Court analyzed trial counsel's decision 
not to put Riley's mother on the stand as follows: 
 
        The record is replete with cir cumstances that 
       support trial counsel's decision not to call Petitioner's 
       mother. First, Petitioner informed trial counsel that he 
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       did not wish to expose his mother's problems at trial. 
       . . . Second, trial counsel testified that Petitioner's 
       mother refused to support Petitioner's alibi, and as a 
       result, he was concerned about the pr osecutor's cross- 
       examination of her during the penalty phase. . . . 
       Third, the record indicates that Petitioner's mother had 
       a severe drinking problem and was drinking heavily at 
       the time of the trial. . . . As a result, trial counsel 
       believed that the witnesses that he chose to call in 
       mitigation, instead, would make a better impr ession on 
       the jury. . . . Under these circumstances, the Court 
       finds trial counsel's decision not to call Petitioner's 
       mother to be reasonable and within the bounds of his 
       strategic discretion. 
 
Riley VI, 1998 WL 172856, at *2. We agree. 
 
We also agree that Riley has not demonstrated that his 
trial attorney was ineffective in failing to locate certain 
other family members. See Riley II, **3-5; Riley V, 585 A.2d 
at 727-28; Riley VI, 1998 WL 172856, at *21. Finally, we 
agree that a strategy of not introducing evidence regarding 
Riley's background and family fell within "the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689. The Superior Court wrote as follows: 
 
       The adverse inferences to be drawn from the fact that 
       defendant's parents were both alcoholics, his sister an 
       unwed mother of three, his brother an incarcerated 
       criminal and his home life a series of jails and 
       temporary living quarters would no doubt have been 
       magnified in the semi-rural county where this case was 
       tried . . . . Likewise, it is certainly within the range of 
       strategic choices to forego mitigating evidence, which 
       may be seen as "excuse making" and rely upon a plea 
       for mercy . . . . In Riley's case, evidence of fered as to 
       mitigating circumstances included: that the actual 
       killer was Tyrone Baxter, the co-defendant; that Baxter 
       received a less severe penalty; and that Riley's 
       background indicated that he was a diligent worker, 
       possessing a non-violent and good character. 
 
       In this case, trial counsel gave a strong ar gument that 
       Riley's life should be spared in light of the fact that 
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       Tyrone Baxter, defendant's accomplice and principal 
       accuser, would be spared the death penalty as the 
       result of a plea bargain. Moreover , Walter Ross testified 
       without contradiction at the [post-conviction r elief] 
       hearing that the defendant did not want his family 
       background discussed at the penalty phase. Given 
       defendant's wishes, the lack of positive evidence in 
       mitigation, counsel's focused argument for leniency in 
       light of Baxter's plea bargain, and the potentially 
       negative impact the purportedly positive evidence 
       would have wrought before the jury, defendant has 
       failed to show that counsel's decision to limit the 
       testimony at the penalty phase was constitutionally 
       deficient. 
 
Riley II, 1988 WL 47076, at *11-12. This analysis was 
accepted by the Delaware Supreme Court and the District 
Court. We cannot disagree. 
 
2. Riley contends that his trial attorney wa s ineffective 
because he did not present testimony by a mental health 
expert. Riley relies on the affidavits of two experts, who 
examined him in connection with the post-conviction relief 
proceeding. One of the experts characterized Riley as a 
person with "borderline defective" intelligence whose 
capacity "for objectively analyzing events, cir cumstances 
and relationships [is] narrowed by stress and complexity." 
Appellant's Br. at 42. We agree with Riley that this 
explanation might have been helpful at the penalty phase. 
The question remains, however, whether trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to obtain such evidence at the time. 
 
In the post-conviction relief proceeding in Superior Court, 
trial counsel testified that he did not seek to have Riley 
examined by a mental health expert because he had no 
reason to think, in light of his conversations with Riley, 
that such an examination would have revealed anything 
useful. See App. 592-96. He testified that Riley appeared to 
understand what they discussed and that Riley pr epared 
and filed some motions on his own behalf. See  App. 592- 
93. Trial counsel stated that Riley never mentioned any 
head injury or any psychological problems. See App. 590. 
Relying on this testimony, the Superior Court found that 
trial counsel "had no inkling that evaluation of Mr. Riley's 
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mental or emotional state might be helpful in mitigation." 
Riley II, 1988 WL 47076, at *7. 
 
Before us, Riley has not argued that counsel in a capital 
case must always seek a mental examination of the 
defendant, and cases from other circuits r eject that 
proposition. Instead, they hold that a case-by-case 
determination must be made and that counsel is not 
ineffective if he or she has no reason to think that a mental 
examination would be useful. See Thomas v. Gilmore, 144 
F.3d 513, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Miller, 
907 F.2d 994, 998-99 (10th Cir. 1990); United States ex rel. 
Rivera v. Franzen, 794 F.2d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 
Under this standard, we see no ground for reversing the 
decision of the District Court here. Riley has simply not 
identified any fact that should have alerted his trial 
attorney that he had mental problems that might have 
provided the basis for mitigation. The only fact even 
mentioned in Riley's briefs is the "implausible" nature of 
Riley's alibi, see Reply Br. at 21, but this is insufficient to 
alert counsel to the possibility of mental pr oblems that 
might be relevant to mitigation. For the most part, Riley 
merely notes what the subsequent examinations by mental 
health experts revealed. However, "[a] fair assessment of 
attorney performance requir es that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 
3. Finally, Riley cites trial counsel's inexperien ce and the 
fact that he spent only 14 hours preparing for the penalty 
phase of the trial. These facts are not comforting, but they 
do not in themselves establish that counsel was inef fective. 
We have taken them into account in evaluating the other 
deficiencies properly asserted in this appeal. We cannot 
say, however, that Riley's constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel was denied. 
 
VI. 
 
Relying on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1985), 
Riley argues that his right to due process was violated 
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because the trial judge refused to appoint co-counsel or an 
investigator to assist his attorney. Riley again notes the 
inexperience of his attorney, and he asserts that co-counsel 
had been appointed in Kent County in prior capital cases. 
Although Riley claims that the lack of co-counsel and an 
investigator caused him "extreme prejudice," his brief 
provides no details. 
 
A. We turn first to Riley's ar gument that he was 
constitutionally entitled to the appointment of co-counsel. 
In some jurisdictions, there is a statutory right to the 
appointment of two defense attorneys in capital cases. See, 
e.g., 18 U.S.C. S 3005. However, we are aware of no 
authority holding that the federal Constitution confers such 
a right, and we see no basis for such a holding. The 
Constitution specifies the quality of r epresentation that all 
criminal defendants, including capital defendants, must 
receive, namely, "reasonably ef fective assistance." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Constitution does not 
specify the number of lawyers who must be appointed. If a 
single attorney provides reasonably effective assistance, the 
Constitution is satisfied, and if a whole team of lawyers 
fails to provide such assistance, the Constitution is 
violated. Thus, there is no constitutional right per se to the 
appointment of co-counsel in a capital case. Bell v. Watkins, 
692 F.2d 999, 1009 (5th Cir. 1982); Jimenez v. State, 703 
So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam); State v. Phelps, 
478 S.E.2d 563, 574-75 (W.Va. 1996) (per curiam); State v. 
Rodriguez, 921 P.2d 643, 652 (Ariz. 1996); Spranger v. 
State, 650 N.E.2d 1117, 1122-23 (Ind. 1995); Uptergrove v. 
State, 881 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). Cf. Hatch 
v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1456 (10th Cir . 1995). 
 
Riley's brief does not identify any unusual featur es of this 
case that demanded the appointment of a second attor ney. 
While he does cite the inexperience of his trial attorney, 
without a showing that this attorney did not provide the 
level of representation requir ed by the Constitution, we 
cannot hold that the failure to appoint co-counsel to assist 
him violated the Constitution. 
 
B. We must also reject Riley's ar gument that the failure 
to appoint a private investigator violated the Constitution. 
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985), 
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the Supreme Court made it clear that ther e is no 
constitutional right to the appointment of an investigator 
where the defendant offers "little mor e than undeveloped 
assertions that the requested assistance would be 
beneficial." See also Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59, 66-67 
(4th Cir. 1995), vacated on other gr ounds sub nom. Gray v. 
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996). Riley has of fered nothing 
more here. 
 
VII. 
 
Riley argues that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights were violated because the prosecutor and the trial 
judge allegedly made remarks to the jury during the 
sentencing phase of the trial that minimized the jury's 
sense of responsibility and led it to believe that its decision 
was not final. We do not agree. 
 
Riley's argument is based on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 
supra. In that case, the defense attorney, in closing 
argument to the jury at the sentencing phase, asked the 
jury to "confront both the gravity and r esponsibility of 
calling for another's death." 472 U.S. at 324. In response, 
the prosecutor strongly disagreed with the defense 
attorney's comments and stated: 
 
       Now, they would have you believe that you're going to 
       kill this man and they know -- they know that your 
       decision is not the final decision. My God, how unfair 
       can you be? Your job is reviewable. They know it. . . . 
       For they know, as I know, and as [the judge] has told 
       you, that the decision you render is automatically 
       reviewable by the Supreme Court. 
 
Id. at 325-26. 
 
By a vote of five to three, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of the state supr eme court 
upholding the defendant's death sentence. In an opinion by 
Justice Marshall, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the prosecutor's comments had impr operly led the 
jurors to believe that the responsibility for determining the 
appropriateness of a death sentence lay elsewhere. In a 
portion of his opinion that was joined by only thr ee other 
 
                                38 
  
justices, Justice Marshall responded to the state's 
argument that the prosecutor's comments were permissible 
because it is proper to give a capital sentencing jury 
accurate information about post-sentencing pr ocedures. 
472 U.S. at 335-36. Justice Marshall rejected this 
argument on two grounds, viz., that the prosecutor's 
remarks were neither "accurate" nor"relevant to a valid 
state penological interest." Id. at 336. He explained: 
 
       [I]t was misleading as to the nature of the appellate 
       court's review and because it depicted the jury's role in 
       a way fundamentally at odds with the role that a 
       capital sentencer must perform. Similarly, the 
       prosecutor's argument is not linked to any arguably 
       valid sentencing consideration. That appellate r eview is 
       available to a capital defendant sentenced to death is 
       no valid basis for a jury to return such a sentence if 
       otherwise it might not. It is simply a factor that in itself 
       is wholly irrelevant to the determination of the 
       appropriate sentence. 
 
Id. 
 
Justice O'Connor, who cast the deciding fifth vote for 
reversal, did not join this part of Justice Marshall's opinion. 
Justice O'Connor refused to endorse the principle that "the 
giving of nonmisleading and accurate information regarding 
the jury's role in the sentencing scheme is irr elevant to the 
sentencing decision." 472 U.S. at 341 (opinion of O'Connor, 
J.)(emphasis added). However, she agr eed that the 
prosecutor's statements were improper because they 
"creat[ed] the mistaken impression that automatic appellate 
review of the jury's sentence would provide the 
authoritative determination of whether death was 
appropriate," whereas in fact the state supreme court 
exercised only a narrow scope of r eview. Id. 
 
In subsequent cases, the Court has clarified the holding 
in Caldwell. In Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994), 
the Court wrote as follows: 
 
       As Justice O'CONNOR supplied the fifth vote in 
       Caldwell, and concurred on grounds narrower than 
       those put forth by the plurality, her position is 
       controlling. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 
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       193 (1977) . . . . Accordingly, we have since r ead 
       Caldwell as "relevant only to certain types of comment 
       --those that mislead the jury as to its role in the 
       sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel 
       less responsible than it should for the sentencing 
       decision." Durden v. Wainwright , 477 U.S. 168, 184, 
       n.15 (1986). Thus, "[t]o establish a Caldwell violation, 
       a defendant necessarily must show that the r emarks to 
       the jury improperly described the role assigned to the 
       jury by local law." Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 
       (1989), see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 233 
       (1990). 
 
The Romano Court rejected the Caldwell argument 
advanced in that case because "the jury was not 
affirmatively misled regarding its role in the sentencing 
process." Id. at 10. Thus, in or der to establish a Caldwell 
violation, a defendant must show that the pr osecutor's 
comments inaccurately or misleadingly minimized the 
finality or importance of the jury's verdict at the penalty 
phase. 
 
Riley's argument is based on a statement made by the 
prosecutor near the very beginning of his summation at the 
sentencing phase of the trial. The prosecutor stated: 
 
       As the Judge has explained to you we have a specific 
       statute with regard to what occurr ed in a penalty 
       hearing on a capital case. 
 
       Let me say at the outset that what you do today is 
       automatically reviewed by our Supreme Court and that 
       is why there is an automatic review on the death 
       penalty. That is why, if you return a decision of death, 
       that is why you will receive and have tofill out a two- 
       page interrogatory that the Court will give you. This is 
       an interrogatory that specifically sets out the questions 
       that the State request and whether or not you believe 
       it beyond a reasonable doubt and if you want in your 
       determination, if you believe the sentence should be 
       death then each and every one of you has to sign this. 
       This goes to the Supreme Court. That is why it is 
       concise and we believe clear and it should be looked 
       carefully on and answered appropriately. 
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App. 393 (emphasis added). Riley points to the highlighted 
words quoted above and adds that "the trial court 
enhanced the jury's sense that the responsibility for Mr. 
Riley's death sentence lay elsewhere by r epeatedly referring 
to the jury's sentencing of Mr. Riley as a 
`recommendation.' " Appellant's Br . at 45. 
 
In its decision on direct appeal, the Delawar e Supreme 
Court responded to this argument as follows: 
 
       [T]he prosecutor's remarks in no way suggested that 
       responsibility for ultimately determining whether 
       defendant faced life imprisonment or death r ested 
       elsewhere. The prosecutor's passing comment to the 
       jury that its decision would be "automatically r eviewed" 
       was fairly made in the context of the prosecutor's 
       preceding reference to the "specific statute [controlling] 
       a penalty hearing on a capital case." 11 Del.C.S 4209. 
       Since subsection (g) of S 4209 mandates the"Automatic 
       Review of Death Penalty by Delaware Supr eme Court", 
       the prosecutor in the instant case was simply quoting 
       the statute. In no sense may it reasonably be said that 
       the prosecutor was either misstating the law, 
       misleading the jury as to its role, or minimizing its 
       sentencing responsibility. 
 
496 A.2d at 1025 (alteration in original). W e agree with this 
analysis. 
 
The prosecutor's remarks in Caldwell  were "quite 
focused, unambiguous, and strong." 472 U.S. at 340. The 
clear message was that, contrary to the suggestion of 
defense counsel that the jury should "confr ont both the 
gravity and responsibility of calling for another's death," id. 
at 324, the jury need not shoulder that responsibility 
because "the authoritative determination of whether death 
was appropriate" would be made by the state supreme 
court. Id. at 343 (Opinion of O'Connor , J.). It was in this 
sense that the remarks " `impr operly described the role 
assigned to the jury by local law' "19 and thus " `allowed the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. at 9 (quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 
U.S. at 407). 
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jury to feel less responsible than it should for the 
sentencing decision.' "20 
 
The prosecutor's remarks in this case wer e very different. 
Here, the prosecutor made accurate, unemotional, passing 
remarks in the context of describing the state statute and 
explaining why the jury would have to "fill out a two-page 
interrogatory" if it returned a capital sentence. These 
remarks did not convey the message that the jury should 
not confront the gravity of returning a death verdict, and 
thus the mere mention of the fact that ther e would be an 
automatic appeal to the state supreme court did not 
mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process. In 
this connection, it is noteworthy that after the closing 
arguments, the trial judge instructed the jury on its role 
using language that left no doubt about its r esponsibility. 
The trial judge stated: "Where the jury submits such a 
finding and recommendation, the Court shall sentence the 
defendant to death." Riley V, 585 A.2d at 731 (emphasis 
added). A "recommendation of death, supported by the 
evidence, shall be binding on the Court." Id. (emphasis 
added). "Your unanimous recommendation for the 
imposition of the death penalty, if supported by the 
evidence, is binding on the Court." Id. at 734 (emphasis 
added). In light of the substantial factual dif ferences 
between Caldwell and this case, and in light of the 
Supreme Court's subsequent explanation of the meaning of 
Caldwell, we reject Riley's Caldwell  claim. 
 
Our dissenting colleague would apparently hold that a 
Caldwell violation occurred simply because the prosecutor 
accurately stated that there would be an automatic appeal 
to the state supreme court without attempting to explain 
the scope of review that the state supr eme court would 
exercise. We do not agree with this reading of Caldwell. 
Neither Justice O'Connor's controlling opinion in Caldwell 
nor the Court's subsequent explanation in Romano  took the 
position that an unadorned reference to automatic judicial 
review of a capital verdict is enough to violate the 
Constitution. Rather, "[t]o establish a Caldwell violation, a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. at 9 (quoting Durden v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. at 184, n.15). 
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defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the 
jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by 
local law." Romano, 512 U.S. at 9 (quoting Dugger v. 
Adams, 489 U.S. at 407). 
 
VIII. 
 
Riley contends that the trial judge contravened the 
holding of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), 
when the judge dismissed two jurors for cause after they 
responded to voir dire questions concer ning capital 
punishment. In Witherspoon, the Supr eme Court held that 
members of a jury panel may not be excused for cause 
"simply because they voiced general objections to the death 
penalty or expressed conscientious or r eligious scruples 
against its infliction." Id. at 522. Some lower courts, 
however, interpreted footnotes in W itherspoon to mean that 
potential jurors could be dismissed only if they stated 
unambiguously that they would automatically vote against 
the death penalty.21 
 
The Supreme Court clarified the meaning of Witherspoon 
in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). The Court held 
that "the proper standard for deter mining when a 
prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his 
or her views on capital punishment . . . is whether the 
juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a jur or in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath.' " Id. at 424 (quoting 
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 45). The Court noted: 
 
       [T]his standard . . . does not require that a juror's bias 
       be proved with `unmistakable clarity' . . . because 
       determinations of juror bias cannot be r educed to 
       question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in 
       the manner of a catechism. What common sense 
       should have realized experience has proved: many 
       veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to 
       reach the point where their bias has been made 
       "unmistakably clear"; these veniremen may not know 
       how they will react when faced with imposing the death 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 419 (1985). 
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       sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish 
       to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in 
       the printed record, however, ther e will be situations 
       where the trial judge is left with the definite impression 
       that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully 
       and impartially apply the law. 
 
Id. at 424-26 (footnote omitted). The Court went on to hold 
that a trial judge's finding under this standar d is entitled to 
the presumption of correctness in 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d).22 
469 U.S. at 428. Applying these standards, the Court 
sustained the dismissal of a juror who said, when asked 
whether her beliefs would interfere with her sitting as a 
juror in a capital case, "I am afraid it would" and "I think 
it would." Id. at 416. 
 
The two potential jurors at issue in the pr esent case are 
Mae Floyd and Gerald Moot. During Floyd's voir dir e, the 
following exchange occurred: 
 
       The Court: . . . Do you have any conscientious scruples 
       against finding a verdict of guilty wher e the 
       punishment might be death or against imposing the 
       death penalty if the evidence should so warrant? 
 
        Ms. Floyd: I would say yes, I think so.  
 
        The Court: You do have conscientious scruples? 
 
        Ms. Floyd: Yes.  
 
        The Court: Regardless of any personal beliefs or 
       feelings you have, if the evidence justified it, would you 
       be able to find a person guilty of murder in the first 
       degree and impose the death penalty? 
 
        Ms. Floyd: That is a hard one to tell you the truth. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. See also Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F .3d 1485, 1498 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)("a trial court may 
excuse a juror for cause where such jur or's views would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with his instructions and his oath. . . . [and] that a state 
trial 
judge's finding that a prospective jur or is impermissibly biased against 
the death penalty is entitled to a presumption of correctness under S28 
U.S.C.A. 2254(d)."). 
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        The Court: I will repeat the question. 
 
        Ms. Floyd: I heard it. All right. Repeat the question. 
 
        The Court: I will repeat it. Regardless of your 
       personal belief or feelings, if the evidence justified it, 
       would you be able to find a person guilty of mur der in 
       the first degree and would you be able to impose the 
       death penalty? 
 
        Ms. Floyd: That is a two-part question, right? 
 
        The Court: Yes, it is. 
 
        Ms. Floyd: The latter part-- 
 
        The Court: First of all, would you be able tofind a 
       person guilty of murder in the first degr ee? 
 
        Ms Floyd: I may, yes. 
 
        The Court: And the second part is would you be able 
       to impose the death penalty? 
 
        Ms. Floyd: I tell you the truth I don't think so. 
 
        The Court: I will excuse you. Thank you very much. 
 
App. 285-86 (emphasis added). 
 
As both the Delaware Supreme Court and the District 
Court observed, Floyd's responses were very similar to 
those of the potential juror in question in Wainwright v. 
Witt, supra. See Riley I, 496 A.2d at 1005-06 Riley VI, 1998 
WL 172856, at *11. We agree with their analysis and hold 
that Riley has not overcome the presumption of correctness 
that attaches to the implicit finding of the trial judge. 
 
The dismissal of the other potential juror in question, 
Gerald Mood, took place after the following colloquy: 
 
       The Court: . . . . Do you have any conscientious 
       scruples against finding a verdict of guilty when the 
       punishment might be death or against imposing the 
       death penalty if the evidence should so warrant? 
 
       Mr. Mood: I don't know. I have mixed emotions about 
       that. 
 
       The Court: Regardless of any personal belief or feelings 
       that you have, if the evidence justified it, would you be 
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       able to find a person guilty of murder in thefirst 
       degree and would you be able to impose the death 
       penalty? 
 
       Mr. Mood: Maybe I could. I don't really know. 
 
       The Court: I am going to excuse you sir . . . . 
 
App. 276. 
 
The District Judge aptly analyzed the dismissal of Mood, 
and we adopt his analysis:23 
 
       Unlike venireperson Floyd, venireperson Mood's 
       responses were much more succinct. Mood twice 
       responded to the trial court's capital punishment 
       questions with the phrase, "I don't know." . .. . 
       Particularly in situations such as this, wher e an 
       individual's record response is so brief that its printed 
       reproduction reveals little, the Court should defer to 
       those credibility factors that would only have been 
       known to the trial court, such as the juror's demeanor, 
       tone of voice and attitude. See Witt, 469 U.S. at 434 
       (emphasizing importance of trial court's assessment of 
       venireperson's demeanor, particularly where printed 
       record may not be "crystal clear"). Accordingly, the 
       Court finds adequate record support for the trial 
       court's decision to excuse venireperson Mood. 
 
Riley VI, 1998 WL 172856, at *12. 
 
IX. 
 
Relying on Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), Riley 
argues that the trial judge erred in failing sua sponte to ask 
prospective jurors during voir dir e whether they would 
automatically impose the death penalty if they found him 
guilty. The District Court rejected this claim on the ground 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. In addition, as the District Court noted, some of the answers given 
by Floyd and Mood to questions not concerning capital punishment may 
have influenced the trial judge's decision to dismiss them. Floyd revealed 
that she knew Tyrone Baxter and was a casual friend of Baxter's mother. 
Mood said that he was a good friend of one of the police officers involved 
in the case and had served with him in the fir e department. See Riley VI, 
1998 WL 172856, at *12. 
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that Morgan requires that such questions be asked only if 
the defense so requests. We agree. 
 
In Morgan, the Supreme Court framed the relevant issue 
in these terms: "whether on voir dir e the court must, on 
defendant's request, inquire into the prospective jurors' 
views on capital punishment." 504 U.S. at 726 (emphasis 
added). The Court stated its holding as follows: 
 
       Petitioner was entitled, upon his request , to inquiry 
       discerning those jurors who, even prior to the State's 
       case in chief, had predetermined the ter minating issue 
       of his trial, that being whether to impose the death 
       penalty. 
 
Id. at 736 (emphasis added). The dissent described the 
Court's holding in similar language: "The Court today holds 
that . . . the Constitution requires that voir dire directed to 
[reverse-Witherspoon] `bias' be provided upon the 
defendant's request." Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 
We cannot regard the Court's choice of words as 
accidental, and we think that the holding of Mor gan is 
clear: a reverse-Witherspoon inquiry must be made "on 
defendant's request." See United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 
861, 879 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 
Riley makes two arguments in response. First, he notes 
that the state supreme court rejected his argument on the 
merits, and he contends that "the State should not now be 
heard to raise alleged procedural bars to federal court 
resolution of the claim on the merits." Appellant's Br. at 52. 
Our holding, however, has nothing to do with a procedural 
bar, i.e., a state rule of procedur e that bars a federal 
habeas court from reaching the merits of a federal claim. 
Rather, our holding is based on the fact that the 
constitutional right recognized in Mor gan applies only if the 
defense makes a request for a reverse-Witherspoon inquiry. 
 
Second, Riley argues that his trial attor ney was 
ineffective in failing to request r everse-Witherspoon 
questioning. However, this argument was not made in the 
state courts, and it is thus procedurally barr ed. 
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X. 
 
Under 11 Del. C. S 4209(g)(2), the Delawar e Supreme 
Court is required to undertake a pr oportionality review in 
death penalty cases. The statute mandates that the Court 
inquire into whether "the death penalty was either 
arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended, or 
disproportionate to the penalty recommended or imposed in 
similar cases." 11 Del. C. S 4209(g)(2)(a). In affirming Riley's 
death sentence, the Delaware Supreme Court examined 21 
cases, including five in which the death penalty was 
imposed. It found that Riley's case was comparable to the 
five death penalty cases (Whalen, Rush, Deputy, Flamer 
and Bailey), because they all involved 
 
       an unprovoked, cold-blooded murder of a helpless 
       person (or persons) committed upon victims lacking the 
       ability to defend themselves and solely for the purposes 
       of pecuniary gain (except in Whalen's case). In none of 
       these killings is there any evidence of pr ovocation or of 
       homicide committed out of passion or rage. In each 
       case, except Whalen, the murder occurred in the court 
       of a robbery that was deliberately planned and carried 
       out with the use of deadly weapons. In each case, the 
       perpetrators of these crimes offered no extenuating 
       circumstance for taking the life of another . 
 
Riley I, 496 A.2d at 1027. 
 
Riley challenges this finding on two grounds. First, he 
points to the fact that two of the death sentences r elied on 
-- Rush and Whalen -- had been vacated. Second, he 
argues that the remaining cases -- Deputy, Bailey, and 
Flamer -- do not furnish appropriate comparisons because 
each involved the killing of more than one person. He 
maintains that these errors violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
It is clear that proportionality review is not required by 
the federal Constitution. See Pulley v. Harris , 465 U.S. 37, 
50-51 (1984). Riley justifies advancing his pr oportionality 
argument in federal court on two grounds. 24 First, he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Ordinarily, federal habeas relief is not available for an error of 
state 
law: the habeas statute provides that a writ disturbing a state court 
judgment may issue only if a prisoner is in custody"in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241(c)(3). See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). 
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argues that the allegedly improper r eview resulted in a 
punishment that was "inherently dispr oportionate and, 
therefore, arbitrary and capricious" in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. Appellant's Br. at 56. Second, he 
argues that Delaware's failure to abide by its own statutory 
scheme for proportionality review violated due process. See 
Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993) 
("the failure of a state to abide by its own statutory 
commands may implicate a liberty interest pr otected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment against arbitrary deprivation by a 
state"). 
 
Riley bases his first argument on the principle that "[i]f a 
State has determined that death should be an available 
penalty for certain crimes, then it must administer the 
penalty in a way that can rationally distinguish between 
those individuals for whom death is an appropriate 
sanction and those for whom it is not." Spaziano v. Florida, 
468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984). Riley claims that the 
proportionality review conducted by the Delaware Supreme 
Court in his case failed to protect him fr om arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty, and in fact upheld a 
disproportionate punishment. This argument rests on the 
premise that applying the death penalty in Riley's case 
would be so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
Therefore, Riley's argument r eally attacks the imposition of 
the penalty itself, rather than the state's method of 
reviewing proportionality. 
 
Riley's argument is not tenable. The Supr eme Court has 
"occasionally struck down punishments as inher ently 
disproportionate, and therefore cruel and unusual, when 
imposed for a particular crime or category of crime." Pulley, 
465 U.S. at 43. However, in this case, Riley's crime -- 
killing a defenseless person without provocation in the 
course of an armed robbery -- is not such that application 
of the death penalty in these circumstances would "shock 
the conscience." See Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1154 
(11th Cir. 1987); Spinkellink v. W ainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 
606 n.28 (5th Cir. 1976). Riley has thus failed to show an 
Eighth Amendment violation. 
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Riley's second argument is based on the principle that 
when a state creates a right, the Due Pr ocess clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment entitles a defendant to pr ocedures 
to ensure that the right is not arbitrarily denied. He argues 
that the Delaware Supreme Court, by failing to conduct an 
adequate proportionality review as r equired by state 
statute, denied him due process. 
 
As a threshold matter, it is unclear whether, under Third 
Circuit law, a state proportionality-r eview statute creates 
any cognizable liberty interest for due pr ocess purposes. 
See Frey v. Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916, 925 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(noting that Supreme Court precedent on this issue is in 
flux). We need not address this question, however, because 
even if Riley has such a liberty interest, he has not shown 
any denial of due process. In evaluating a claim that a state 
court erred in conducting its proportionality review, a 
federal court may only inquire into whether the state court 
"undertook its proportionality review in good faith and 
found that [the defendant's] sentence was pr oportional to 
the sentences imposed in cases similar to his." Walton v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990). Because ther e is no 
federal constitutional right to proportionality review, if the 
federal court finds that the review was undertaken in good 
faith, it cannot "look behind" the state court's conclusion of 
proportionality to consider whether the state court 
misapplied state proportionality law. See id.; Bannister v. 
Delo, 100 F.3d 610, 627 (8th Cir. 1996). In this case, the 
Delaware Supreme Court compared Riley's case with a 
substantial number of other death-eligible cases, and, even 
disregarding the two vacated death sentences, it found 
common characteristics between Riley's case and thr ee 
other cases in which the sentence was not vacated. 
Although Riley argues that these cases ar e not entirely 
analogous, because each contained an additional 
aggravating factor (more than one victim), ther e is no 
indication that the Delaware court acted in bad faith in 
conducting its review. We are thus without power to order 
habeas relief. 
 
XI 
 
We now turn to Riley's contentions concerning jury 
instructions given by the trial judge at the sentencing 
phase. 
 
                                50 
  
 
Volume 2 of 2 
 
  
A. 
 
Riley argues that the jury instructions at the penalty 
phase impermissibly restricted the jury's consideration of 
mitigating circumstances. He takes issue with the following 
instruction, issued at the start of the penalty hearing: 
 
A sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury 
finds: 
 
       (1) Beyond a reasonable doubt at least one statutory 
       aggravating circumstance; and 
 
       (2) Unanimously recommends, after weighing all 
       relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation 
       which bears upon the particular circumstances or 
       details of the commission of the offense and the 
       character and propensities of the offender, that a 
       sentence of death shall be imposed. Where the 
       jury submits such a finding and recommendation, 
       the Court shall sentence the defendant to death. A 
       finding by the jury of a statutory aggravating 
       circumstance, and a consequent recommendation of 
       death, supported by the evidence, shall be binding 
       on the Court. 
 
App. 392 (emphasis added). Riley contends that, given the 
placement of the word "consequent," "a reasonable jury 
could understand the underscored sentence to mean that 
the effect of a finding that a statutory aggravating 
circumstance existed, is that the death penalty must be 
imposed." Appellant's Br. 59. Because the trial judge had 
previously informed the jury that the statutory aggravating 
circumstance -- commission of the mur der during a 
robbery -- had already been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt in the guilt phase, Riley argues that a reasonable 
jury could have read the instruction to mean that it need 
not consider mitigation evidence. 
 
When reviewing a jury instruction that is claimed to 
impermissibly restrict a jury's consideration of relevant 
evidence, a court must ask "whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged 
instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of 
constitutionally relevant evidence." Boyde v. California, 494 
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U.S. 370, 380 (1990). If there is "only a possibility" of such 
inhibition, however, the challenge must fail. Id. Moreover, 
the challenged instructions "must be evaluated not in 
isolation but in the context of the entire char ge." Jones v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 373, 391 (1999). 
 
When the jury charge is read as a whole, there is no 
reasonable likelihood that a jury could have understood it 
to preclude consideration of mitigating cir cumstances. At 
the close of the penalty hearing, the court again instructed 
the jury in terms that cleared up any ambiguity that might 
have been present in its earlier instruction: 
 
       In conclusion, a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
       unless you, the jury, find: 
 
       (1) Beyond a reasonable doubt at least one statutory 
       aggravating circumstance has been established; 
       and 
 
       (2) Unanimously recommend that a sentence of death 
       be imposed after weighing all relevant evidence in 
       aggravation and mitigation which bear upon the 
       particular circumstances and details of the 
       commission of the offense and the character and 
       propensities of the offender. 
 
       Should you fail to agree unanimously to either of these 
       two matters, the Court shall sentence the defendant to 
       life imprisonment without benefit of probation or 
       parole. 
 
App. 438-40 (emphasis added). 
 
This instruction made it clear that a jury was r equired 
both to find at least one statutory aggravator and to weigh 
aggravating factors against mitigating factors in or der to 
support a death sentence. This belies Riley's ar gument that 
the jury was misled into believing that its job was done 
once the felony murder aggravator was found. 
 
B. 
 
Riley next takes issue with the trial court's failur e at the 
penalty phase to instruct the jury that it was r equired to 
conclude unanimously that aggravating circumstances 
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outweigh mitigating circumstances befor e imposing death, 
as required by Delaware law. See Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 
552, 560 (Del. 1985) (setting forth "outweighing" standard). 
Rather, the court simply instructed the jury that it had to 
"[u]nanimously recommend that a sentence of death be 
imposed after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation 
and mitigation." App. 438; see also App. 392, 437. 
 
This argument provides no grounds for habeas relief. The 
federal Constitution does not require"specific standards for 
balancing aggravating against mitigating cir cumstances." 
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876 n.13 (1983). As long as 
a jury is permitted to consider all relevant mitigating 
circumstances in making its death recommendation, there 
is no federal constitutional problem. In addition, Riley has 
not suggested how a jury's decision would be any dif ferent 
under the language the court used in this case. Because 
the jury was instructed not to make a sentencing 
recommendation until after it had "weigh[ed] all relevant 
evidence in aggravation and mitigation," the necessary 
inference was that the death penalty should be imposed 
only if aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors 
(otherwise, the entire "weighing" pr ocess would be 
meaningless). 
 
C. 
 
Finally, Riley argues that the penalty phase instructions 
improperly suggested that the jury had to be unanimous in 
imposing a life sentence, in violation of Whalen v. State, 
492 A.2d 552, 562 (Del. 1985). He points to the instruction 
that "[i]f you are not unanimous in your recommendation to 
impose the death penalty, or you cannot agr ee unanimously 
as to your recommendation, then the Court is bound to 
impose a sentence of life." App. 438 (emphasis added). The 
word "recommendation" in the underlined phrase, he 
suggests, could be read to refer to a life sentence 
recommendation as well as to a recommendation of death. 
 
As a threshold issue, the government ar gues that Riley 
failed to raise this issue before the District Court because 
he based his argument there "solely on the interpretation of 
the interrogatories posed to the jury" rather than on the 
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jury instruction he points to here. Appellee's Br. at 75. 
However, Riley, although pointing specifically to the 
interrogatories to support his point, nevertheless raised the 
general argument in his amended petition that"the 
instructions were likely to confuse the jury about whether 
the verdict must be unanimous." App. 1191. This is 
sufficient to preserve his argument before this Court. 
 
On the merits, however, Riley's claim must fail. First, 
when the jury charge is viewed as a whole, it reveals several 
instances in which the word "unanimous" was explicitly 
paired solely with the death recommendation. In light of 
this pattern, it appears unlikely that the jury would have 
viewed the isolated passage that Riley relies on as 
extending the unanimity requirement to a r ecommendation 
of life imprisonment. Second, the Delaware Supr eme Court, 
in reviewing this allegation, stated that it was "satisfied that 
the jury understood that, in the event of its failur e to 
unanimously agree upon imposition of a death penalty, an 
imposition of life imprisonment would result." Riley V, 585 
A.2d at 725. Because the instruction made clear that the 
default rule in case of a lack of unanimity was life 
imprisonment, it is hard to see how the jury's deliberations 
would have been affected even had it adopted Riley's 
interpretation of the instruction. Finally, the challenged 
instruction was identical to one approved by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104 (Del. 
1984), aff 'd sub nom. Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 710 (3d 
Cir. 1995) and Flamer v. Delaware , 68 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 
1995) (en banc). The Delaware Supreme Court explicitly 
pointed to the similarities with Flamer, and distinguished 
the instructions from those in Whalen, in upholding the 
death sentence on direct appeal. See Riley , 585 A.2d at 
722-25. For these reasons, we reject Riley's claim. 
 
XII. 
 
Riley was convicted of intentional murder and felony 
murder, with the underlying felony beingfirst-degree 
robbery. The statutory aggravating circumstance relied on 
for the death sentence was that the murder was committed 
while Riley was engaged in the commission of first degree 
robbery. See 11 Del. C. S 4209(e)(1)(j) (establishing felony 
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murder aggravator). Riley argues that it is unconstitutional 
to double-count robbery as both an element of the crime 
(felony murder) that made Riley death-eligible and as a 
statutory aggravating circumstance. 
 
This Court rejected precisely the same claim in Deputy v. 
Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485,1502 (3d Cir . 1994), holding that 
"within the context of Delaware's death penalty statute, the 
provision requiring the double-counting of the felony at the 
guilty phase and sentencing phase does not imper missibly 
weaken the statute's constitutionally mandated narr owing 
function." This precedent binds our panel. 
 
XIII 
 
Riley's final argument is that the District Court erred in 
denying his motion for funds for investigative and expert 
assistance and in refusing to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing. We disagree. 
 
A. 
 
Under 18 U.S.C. S 3006A(e) and 21 U.S.C. S 848(q)(4)(B) 
and (9), Riley was entitled to investigative and expert 
assistance upon a finding that such assistance was 
"necessary" or "reasonably necessary" with respect to his 
representation in the habeas proceeding. Riley sought the 
services of an investigator to gather additional evidence 
concerning his childhood experiences. He sought the 
services of a forensic psychiatrist to develop further 
mitigating evidence concerning his mental pr oblems. All of 
these services were requested in or der to support Riley's 
arguments that his trial attorney was ineffective at the 
penalty phase and that the trial judge should have 
appointed a co-counsel and investigator to assist him. 
 
Riley has not shown that the services in question were 
"necessary" or "reasonably necessary." The discovery at the 
time of the federal habeas proceeding of new evidence about 
Riley's childhood would not have shown that the ef forts of 
Riley's trial attorney to locate family members who might 
have testified about such matters were objectively 
unreasonable. See pages 30-33, supra. Nor would the 
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discovery of such evidence have demonstrated that it was 
strategically unreasonable for Riley's trial attorney to 
eschew a penalty-phase defense based on Riley's"social 
history." See id. Similarly, the development of additional 
evidence regarding Riley's mental condition at the time of 
the federal habeas proceeding would not have shown that 
Riley's trial attorney was objectively unr easonable in not 
seeking a mental examination prior to the penalty. See 
pages 33-35, supra. 
 
B. 
 
"Where the District Court denies the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the absence of an evidentiary hearing," we 
ask, first, "whether the petitioner asserts facts which entitle 
him to relief " and, second, "whether an evidentiary hearing 
is needed." Todaro v. Fulcomer , 944 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d 
Cir. 1991). See also Heiser v. Ryan, 951 F.2d 559, 561 (3d 
Cir. 1991). Riley argues that the District Court should have 
held an evidentiary hearing concerning the pr osecution's 
peremptory challenges, the impartiality of the jury, his 
Brady claim, and other unspecified issues. W e disagree. As 
previously discussed, we are requir ed to accept the state 
courts' findings regarding the per emptory challenges and 
the impartiality of the jury, and those findings are 
dispositive. Thus, an evidentiary hearing in federal court on 
those matters was not needed. In addition, in light of the 
revelation after briefing that no conversation in which 
Baxter participated is listed in the logs of the wir etap on 
Mrs. Baxter's telephone, it is clear that ther e was no need 
for an evidentiary hearing concerning Riley's Brady claim. 
Nor do we believe that the District Court was an evidentiary 
hearing was needed on any other matter. 
 
XIV. 
 
For the reasons explained above, the decision of the 
District Court is affirmed. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
 
The considerable deference that we are obliged to give to 
state court findings of fact does not requir e that we give 
uncritical acceptance to a prosecutor's story merely 
because a state judge accepted it when the story cries out 
for skepticism and is inherently improbable. The prosecutor 
would have us believe that six years after the trial, without 
the help of contemporaneous notes, he remember ed (for the 
first time) that a prospective juror paused ("a significant 
pause") before the juror answer ed the trial judge's voir dire 
inquiry whether he would be able to retur n a death penalty. 
And the prosecutor would have us believe that he exercised 
one of the state's peremptory challenges to strike the juror 
for that reason. The fact that the juror was black 
supposedly was irrelevant to the prosecutor's decision. 
 
The same prosecutor would also have us believe that he 
struck another juror (the second of the thr ee prospective 
black jurors) because he wanted to be excused so he could 
return to work (which the prospective juror later testified he 
never requested). Inexplicably, the prosecutor who 
remembered the black juror who allegedly paused (although 
he made no note of it) could not remember that he did not 
strike a white juror who really did want to be excused 
because of work, even though the prosecutor had made a 
note that that juror "want[ed] off." As a result, there were 
no black or other minority jurors on appellant Riley's petit 
jury. And there were no black jurors on any capital case 
tried by that prosecutor's office that year . The prosecutor's 
story strains credulity even further when it is recalled that 
on the direct appeal to the Delaware Supr eme Court in this 
case the State's alternative argument defended the use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on "group 
association," a euphemism for race. 
 
I dissent from the majority opinion because I believe the 
record in this case compels the conclusion that the 
prosecution, in pursuing its express goal of "mak[ing] sure 
that James Riley received the death penalty," App. at 797, 
violated Riley's constitutional rights under Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 
472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
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I. 
 
The victim in this case, James Feeley, was a 59 year old 
white man who was shot to death during a robbery of his 
liquor store in Dover, Delaware. As the majority notes, the 
robbers were leaving after grabbing some cash and shooting 
Feeley in the leg when Feeley threw a wine bottle, which 
apparently precipitated the shot that killed him. Appellant 
Riley, a 22 year old black man, Tyrone Baxter , and Michael 
Williams were arrested for his mur der. Riley was 
represented at trial by appointed counsel, a defense-side 
civil litigator who had never represented a criminal 
defendant in either a murder or a capital case. Riley was 
tried and convicted before an all-white jury and, four days 
later, was sentenced to death. Riley's attor ney, who spent 
only fourteen hours preparing for the penalty phase, 
explained to the trial court that he had been too busy "with 
the defense and the merits" to spend more time building a 
case in mitigation. App. at 443-44. 
 
The prosecutors in Riley's case were James Liguori and 
Mark McNulty. Liguori, the lead prosecutor , was a friend 
and neighbor of Feeley's, and his stated intent was"to 
make sure we were not only going to get a conviction of 
murder in the first degree, but also the death penalty." App. 
at 797. While that goal was not unlawful, on this r ecord I 
can only conclude that the prosecution, in at least two 
respects, overstepped the line drawn by Supr eme Court 
cases. 
 
II. 
 
The Batson Claim 
 
A. 
 
Evidence of Peremptory Strikes in Kent County  
 
After general voir dire and dismissals for cause in Riley's 
trial, three prospective black jur ors remained available to 
serve on the jury: Ray Nichols, Lois Beecher , and Charles 
McGuire. The prosecution used three of its peremptory 
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challenges to remove them, and Riley was tried and 
sentenced before an all-white jury. 
 
It is well-settled that the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits discrimination on account of race in selection of 
both the venire and the petit jury. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 
88. This principle, which dates back at least as far as 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), recognizes 
that racial discrimination in selection of jur ors harms "not 
only the accused whose life or liberty they ar e summoned 
to try," Batson, 476 U.S. at 87, but also harms the 
potential juror, whose race "simply`is unrelated to his 
fitness as a juror.' " Id. (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 
328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
 
Under Batson, the defendant who seeks to establish that 
the state's use of peremptory challenges violated the Equal 
Protection Clause must first make a prima facie showing of 
a constitutional violation. Once the defendant makes that 
showing, the prosecution must articulate a race-neutral 
explanation for its use of a peremptory challenge and, if it 
does, the trial court must determine whether the defendant 
has proven purposeful discrimination. See Simmons v. 
Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1167 (3d Cir . 1995). Judge Steele, the 
judge in the Superior Court of Delaware (a trial court) who 
presided over Riley's post-conviction pr oceedings, 
determined, and the state does not contest, that Riley made 
out a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection. 
Accordingly, he conducted an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether Riley had established purposeful 
discrimination. 
 
At the hearing, Liguori, the state's principal witness, 
proffered race-neutral reasons for the prosecution's 
decision to strike three black jurors fr om Riley's case. In 
reply, Riley presented evidence that in addition to the three 
jurors in his trial, the Kent County Pr osecutor's office used 
its peremptory challenges to remove every prospective black 
juror in the three other first-degr ee murder trials that 
occurred within a year of his trial. Riley also presented 
evidence specific to his case that the prosecution had failed 
to apply its purportedly race-neutral criteria evenhandedly 
with respect to the prospective black jur ors. The court 
rejected Riley's Batson claim without mentioning any of this 
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evidence, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, 
likewise without discussion of this evidence. In my view, 
the record simply does not support the purported race- 
neutral reason with respect to at least one of the three 
jurors. Although I also question the state's use of 
peremptory challenges to strike the two other black jurors 
in Riley's case, the exclusion of even one jur or on the basis 
of race violates the Constitution. See Harrison v. Ryan, 909 
F.2d 84, 88 (3d Cir. 1990). The evidence of the striking of 
the black jurors in Riley's trial is mor e telling when viewed 
in the light of the state's similar conduct in 
contemporaneous trials. 
 
At the post-conviction hearing, Riley presented evidence 
that the Kent County Prosecutor used per emptory 
challenges to remove every prospective black juror, not only 
in his trial but also in three other first-degree murder trials 
that occurred within a year of his trial. In these four trials 
(including Riley's), the prosecution struck all eight 
prospective black jurors who were called, i.e., 100 percent. 
By contrast, the prosecution used its per emptory 
challenges to strike only 23 of the 71 prospective white 
jurors, or 32 percent.1 
 
At the post-conviction hearing, counsel for the state 
objected to the admission of this evidence, ar guing that 
evidence of general prosecutorial practices was relevant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The four trials were: 
 
       a. Andre Deputy -- state struck the lone prospective black juror, a 
       second juror designated as "Indian," and six prospective white 
       jurors; 
 
       b. Judith McBride -- state struck all thr ee prospective black 
       jurors, five whites, plus two other jur ors whose race has not 
       been identified; 
 
       c. Riley -- state struck all three pr ospective black jurors and 
eight 
       whites; and 
 
       d. Daniel Pregent -- state struck the lone prospective black juror 
       and four whites. 
 
Although the race of two of the jurors who wer e ultimately empaneled 
has not been identified, the state does not contest Riley's assertion that 
every empaneled juror was white. 
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only to Riley's prima facie case. The court r ejected this 
argument and admitted the evidence, explaining that the 
evidence was being offered to show that"the peremptory 
challenges in this particular case followed some kind of 
pattern that exists in the prosecutorial actions in first 
degree murder cases involving minority defendants."2 App. 
at 872. 
 
Counsel for the state then requested and r eceived an 
additional month in which to "attempt to pr epare the same 
sort of information which we feel would be contrary to the 
representations made by [Riley's counsel]." App. at 874. He 
informed the Superior Court that he had not yet been able 
to obtain materials from other cases, but he assured the 
court that "they do exist." App. at 874. However, 
approximately one month after the hearing the state 
submitted a letter expressly declining to supplement the 
record with evidence from other cases. In fact, the state 
never even argued to the Superior Court that Riley's 
evidence failed accurately to represent Kent County 
prosecutorial practices, and it has not so ar gued to this 
court either. 
 
Typically, "[w]here relevant infor mation . . . is in the 
possession of one party and not provided, then an adverse 
inference may be drawn that such information would be 
harmful to the party who fails to provide it." McMahan & 
Co. v. Po Folks, Inc., 206 F.3d 627, 632 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(quotation omitted); see also Interstate Cir cuit, Inc. v. United 
States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) ("The pr oduction of weak 
evidence when strong is available can lead only to the 
conclusion that the strong would have been adverse."). 
However, the majority declines to give Riley's evidence "any 
weight" whatsoever. Maj. Op. at 16. The majority gives 
several reasons for its decision to disr egard this evidence, 
none of which is persuasive and all of which ar e wrong. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As the majority points out, not all of the defendants in Riley's sample 
were minorities, but that is immaterial to whether the Kent County 
prosecutor struck black jurors on account of their race. Excluding jurors 
on the basis of race is unconstitutional regar dless of the race of the 
defendant. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
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For example, the majority states that in two of the trials 
-- Daniel Pregent's and Judith McBride's-- the defense 
apparently did not raise a Batson objection. The majority 
argues that "it is doubtful that the patter n of strikes [in 
Pregent's case] . . . sufficed to make out a prima facie case," 
id., and that, with respect to McBride's trial, there is no 
way of determining whether any jurors wer e removed 
because of their race. These are non-sequiturs. Riley had to 
prove discrimination in his trial, not in Pr egent's and 
McBride's. If the majority's point is that Riley's evidence is 
irrelevant unless each separate component was itself 
established to be a Batson violation, that proposition has 
no basis in the law or in common sense. The evidence 
demonstrates a pattern of striking black jur ors at 
significantly higher rates than white jurors. One 
permissible (indeed, the most plausible) infer ence to be 
drawn from the data is that the Kent County Pr osecutor 
followed a pattern of using peremptory challenges in a 
racially discriminatory manner. Indeed, that is precisely the 
purpose for which the Superior Court admitted this evidence.3 
 
The majority seeks to dispel, or at least neutralize, the 
unmistakable inference to be drawn from this pattern of 
striking all black jurors by pr offering explanations that the 
prosecutor never proffered in the state proceedings. The 
majority even excuses the failure of the state to produce 
any evidence to counter Riley's statistical evidence by 
suggesting that the data "did not raise an infer ence of 
discrimination, and thus additional data wer e not needed to 
refute Riley's statistical showing." Maj. Op. at 17. 
 
At most, the majority can simply state the obvious-- that 
the evidence presented by Riley is imper fect. The most 
glaring imperfection is, of course, the small size of Riley's 
sample. Conceivably, evidence from other trials might cast 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The majority also asserts that Riley's data ar e flawed because we do 
not know the identity of the prosecutors who participated in jury 
selection in these cases. While this objection might have more force if 
there was evidence that the use of peremptory challenges in Kent County 
varied from case to case, there is no such evidence here. Moreover, a 
newspaper article published during the trial described Liguori, the lead 
prosecutor in Riley's trial, as "the chief prosecutor in Kent County." 
App. 
at 1442. 
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the practices in Kent County in a differ ent light. But it was 
the state, not Riley, that would have had access to such 
evidence, it was the state that asserted that such evidence 
was available and forthcoming, and it was the state, not 
Riley, that failed to provide it. Riley's evidence from prior 
trials was powerful evidence in his favor , and I believe the 
failure of the Superior Court, which had pr eviously 
acknowledged the relevance of this evidence, to mention it 
and include it in the calculus leading to its final decision to 
deny Riley's post-conviction motion undermines that 
decision. 
 
B. 
 
Evidence of Pretext 
 
I am equally troubled by the failure of the state courts to 
discuss the evidence Riley presented to contradict the race- 
neutral reasons offered by the pr osecution for striking the 
black jurors in his trial. At the post-conviction hearing, 
held six years after Riley's trial, Liguori testified that the 
prosecution's strategy in Riley's trial was"to make sure we 
were not only going to get a conviction of mur der in the 
first degree, but also the death penalty." App. at 797. He 
also testified that the prosecutors wanted"to have minority 
representation on the jury panel," App. at 792-93, and 
attempted to explain the prosecution's decision to challenge 
all three prospective black jurors. I will focus here on two 
of these jurors, Ray Nichols and Charles McGuir e. 
 
With respect to Nichols, Liguori r emembered clearly that 
"Mr. Nichols was an individual who, and unfortunately the 
record doesn't reflect this, who was not, in my particular 
mind, not certain with regard to being able to return a 
verdict for death." App. at 797-98. The r ecord reflects no 
such uncertainty on Nichols's part. At voir dir e, Nichols 
answered the two questions posed by the court r egarding 
the jurors' willingness to sentence a defendant to death in 
a manner seemingly favorable to the prosecution: 
 
       Q: Do you have any conscientious scruples against 
       finding a verdict of guilty where the punishment 
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       might be death or against imposing the death 
       penalty even if the evidence should so warrant? 
 
       A: No. 
 
       Q: Regardless of any personal beliefs or feelings that 
       you may have, if the evidence justified it, would 
       you be able to find a person guilty of mur der in the 
       first degree and would you be able to impose the 
       death penalty. 
 
       A: I think so. 
 
App. at 226-27. 
 
Nonetheless, Liguori struck Nichols because, as he 
explained at the post-conviction hearing, "ther e was a 
pause and a significant pause in [Nichols's] answering [the 
court's] inquiry." App. at 798-99. Despite this alleged 
pause, the prosecutors did not ask the trial court to remove 
Nichols for cause or to inquire further into Nichols's 
willingness to award the death penalty. 
 
With respect to Charles McGuire, Liguori's memory was 
also clear. He stated: 
 
        I remember this one. Mr. McGuir e was an individual 
       who had requested -- remember, this was going to be 
       around Christmas also. 
 
        Mr. McGuire had previously requested to be excused 
       from jury service. When Mr. McGuir e came up, the first 
       thing I wanted to make clear -- as I said earlier , I 
       wanted someone that was going to be attentive and you 
       can read all the books you want with regar d to 
       selecting prospective jurors and it is always make sure 
       you have attentive jurors, people not concer ned about 
       getting home early to take care of their kids, or 
       vacation. 
 
        Mr. McGuire himself had requested the Court to 
       excuse him. The Court didn't. When he went thr ough 
       his inquiry, we asked the judge to excuse him for 
       cause. The judge said no. It then left us with no 
       alternative but to think he would not give his full time 
       and attention and therefore we struck Mr . McGuire. 
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App. at 801 (emphasis added). McGuire's pr esumed 
inability to "give his full time and attention" was the only 
reason Liguori offered for excluding him. 
 
On cross-examination, Riley's attorney introduced 
Liguori's handwritten notes from voir dir e at Riley's trial. 
Written next to McGuire's name was the word "Out." Among 
the names on the same page was that of Charles Reed, a 
white man who was ultimately seated on the jury. Next to 
Reed's name on the sheet was written, "works Lowe's, 
wants off." App. at 823. 
 
Despite repeated efforts by Riley's counsel to refresh his 
recollection, Liguori testified that he had no recollection of 
Reed, a juror who actually served on Riley's trial. Liguori 
agreed, however, that the notation next to Reed's name 
indicated that Reed had requested to be excused from 
service on the jury. Liguori offered no explanation for his 
decision not to strike Reed. 
 
The similarity between the two prospective jur ors is 
obvious -- in each case the state believed that the juror 
wanted to be excused. The only distinction between the 
jurors apparent on the record is equally obvious -- 
McGuire, who was struck, is black; Reed, who was 
retained, is white. 
 
Nonetheless, as with Riley's evidence of the patter n of 
race-based strikes in other trials, the state courts failed 
even to mention this evidence and the majority strains to 
find reasons to disregard it. The majority asserts, for 
example, that "Reed may have had a r elatively weak desire 
and reason to be excused, and his situation may not have 
been at all comparable in this respect to McGuire's." Maj. 
Op. at 24 (emphases added). The majority further explains 
that it is not willing to assume "that Reed's desire to be 
excused was related to his employment." Id. at 24 n.12. 
This "distinction" between Reed and McGuir e is not only 
unsupported by the record, it is irr elevant. Liguori did not 
testify, nor can it be inferred from his testimony, that it was 
significant that McGuire's purported desir e to be excused 
was work-related. Instead, Liguori testified that he struck 
McGuire because he believed McGuire wanted off the jury 
and would therefore not be attentive at trial. The record 
strongly suggests that justification applied equally to Reed. 
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The comparison between Reed and McGuire is telling 
evidence that the prosecution's asserted justification for 
striking McGuire was pretextual. See Turner v. Marshall, 
121 F.3d 1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 1997) ("A comparative 
analysis of jurors struck and those remaining is a well- 
established tool for exploring the possibility that facially 
race-neutral reasons are a pretext for discrimination."). 
This evidence alone is strongly suggestive of the race-based 
use of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Devose v. Norris, 53 
F.3d 201 (8th Cir. 1995) (Batson  violation where only 
justification prosecutor offered for striking three out of four 
black jurors with prior jury experience was that jurors 
might be "burned out" by prior service; at least five white 
jurors were not stricken although they had previously 
served on juries); Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509, 514 (8th 
Cir. 1987) (prosecutor's explanation for striking black jurors 
"seems clearly pretextual in light of his decision not to 
strike white jurors who differed in no significant way"); see 
also Turner, 121 F.3d 1253-54 (r eversing, under clear error 
standard, finding that prosecutor did not discriminate in 
jury selection where sole justification of fered for striking a 
black juror applied equally to non-stricken white juror); 
Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960 (3d Cir . 1993) (reversing, 
under plenary review, denial of habeas r elief where 
prosecutor did not apply purportedly race-neutral policy to 
similar white jurors). 
 
However, we need not view each piece of evidence in 
isolation. It is clear that "[a]n explanation for a particular 
challenge need not necessarily be pigeon-holed as wholly 
acceptable or wholly unacceptable. The relative plausibility 
or implausibility of each explanation for a particular 
challenge . . . may strengthen or weaken the assessment of 
the prosecution's explanation as to other challenges." 
United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1991). 
In short, "[a] reviewing court's level of suspicion may also 
be raised by a series of very weak explanations for a 
prosecutor's peremptory challenges. The whole may be 
greater than the sum of its parts." Caldwell v. Maloney, 159 
F.3d 639, 651 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 
Despite the majority's efforts to explain away the various 
parts of the evidentiary picture Riley has pr esented, the 
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record as a whole squarely contradicts the Superior Court's 
decision. First, the prosecution offer ed a highly dubious 
justification for its decision to strike Ray Nichols. While 
standing alone the questionable nature of this explanation 
might not carry much weight, the prosecution's explanation 
for striking Nichols must be evaluated in light of not only 
the uncontested evidence of the use of peremptory strikes 
in Kent County but also the evidence of pretext in the 
striking of Charles McGuire. Viewed as a whole, I believe 
this evidence requires a finding contrary to that reached by 
the Superior Court. 
 
In the end, the majority's result can be justified on little 
more than the presumption of correctness afforded state 
court fact-finding in habeas proceedings. The version of 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(d) that applies to this case r equires us to 
defer to state court findings that are "fairly supported by 
the record." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(8). While I do not deny that 
the limited nature of our review r eflects important policy 
considerations, see, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 
(1985) (presumption recognizes that "as a matter of the 
sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better 
positioned than another to decide the issue"), the 
presumption of correctness does not "so limit federal review 
that it is a nullity." Caldwell v. Maloney , 159 F.3d 639, 651 
(1st Cir. 1998). In this respect, Ligouri's explanation of the 
strikes of black jurors is neither "coher ent" nor "facially 
plausible," the express limitation that the Supreme Court 
itself included in commenting on the deference to be given 
a judge's credibility finding in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 
470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985), in the very quote r epeated by the 
majority. See Maj. Op. at 18-19 n.8. 
 
In this case there is not only the substantial evidence of 
the race-based use of peremptory challenges in 
contemporary trials but there is also evidence that throws 
into question the explanation offered by the prosecutor for 
striking at least one of the black jurors in Riley's case. The 
state courts rejected Riley's Batson claim without 
discussing any of the ample evidence favorable to Riley and 
the majority points to nothing relevant in the record that 
might otherwise support the state courts' decisions. 
Looking at the key to the state's case, the striking of 
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Nichols allegedly because he paused in answering the 
court's inquiry whether he could impose the death penalty, 
the majority lamely responds that a significant pause "is 
not something that a transcript is likely to captur e." Maj. 
Op. at 19 n.9. But the prosecutor did make notes during 
the voir dire as to decisions whether to strike other jurors, 
but offered no contemporaneous note as to Nichols' 
"pause." In a death case, a pause, even "a significant 
pause," conveniently recalled by the pr osecutor six years 
after jury selection, is a slim reed on which to sustain the 
prosecutor's explanation, particularly when that 
explanation is unsupported by any recor d evidence. No 
principle of deference to state court fact-finding can justify 
this court's rejection of Riley's Batson  claim. 
 
III. 
 
The Caldwell Claim 
 
I believe the majority's conclusion that Riley failed to 
establish a violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 U.S. 
320 (1985), is similarly faulty. In Caldwell the Supreme 
Court held that prosecutorial comments str essing that the 
jury's sentence would be reviewed for corr ectness by the 
state supreme court violated the Eighth Amendment by 
leading the jury to believe that ultimate responsibility for 
determining the appropriateness of the death sentence 
rested with an appellate court. As the Supr eme Court later 
explained, prosecutorial comments that "mislead the jury 
as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows 
the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the 
sentencing decision" are prohibited. Romano v. Oklahoma, 
512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994) (quotation omitted). 
 
Relying on the principle that a prosecutor's r emarks do 
not violate Caldwell unless "they impr operly describe[ ] the 
role assigned to the jury by local law," id. (quotation 
omitted), the majority rejects Riley's Caldwell claim. The 
statements made by the prosecutor in Riley's trial, however, 
were no more accurate than those in Caldwell. 
 
In Caldwell, the defense attorney in a capital murder 
case pleaded with the jury in closing arguments at the 
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sentencing phase to spare the defendant's life. In reply, the 
prosecutor stated: 
 
       Ladies and gentlemen, I intend to be brief. I'm in 
       complete disagreement with the approach the defense 
       has taken. I don't think it's fair. I think it's unfair. I 
       think the lawyers know better. Now, they would have 
       you believe that you're going to kill this man and they 
       know -- they know that your decision is not the final 
       decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Y our job is 
       reviewable. They know it. 
 
Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 325 (emphases added). 
 
Defense counsel objected to this statement but the trial 
court overruled the objection, stating that it was"proper 
that the jury realizes that it is reviewable automatically as 
the death penalty commands." Id. The pr osecutor 
continued: 
 
       Throughout their remarks, they attempted to give you 
       the opposite, sparing the truth. They said `Thou shalt 
       not kill.' If that applies to him, it applies to you, 
       insinuating that your decision is the final decision and 
       that they're gonna take Bobby Caldwell out in the front 
       of this Courthouse in moments and string him up and 
       that is terribly, terribly unfair. For they know, as I 
       know, and as Judge Baker has told you, that the 
       decision you render is automatically reviewable by the 
       Supreme Court. Automatically, and I think it's unfair 
       and I don't mind telling them so. 
 
Id. at 325-26. 
 
Although the jury's sentence in Caldwell was indeed 
subject to automatic review by the state supr eme court, 
Justice O'Connor, who cast the fifth and deciding vote, 
emphasized that "[j]urors may harbor misconceptions about 
the power of state appellate courts or, for that matter, [the 
Supreme Court] to override a jury's sentence of death." Id. 
at 342 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Accor ding to Justice 
O'Connor, the prosecutor's statements were impermissible 
because they conveyed to the jury that automatic appellate 
review "would provide the authoritative determination of 
whether death was appropriate" whereas under state law 
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the relevant scope of review was limited to whether the 
verdict was "so arbitrary that it was against the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence." Id. at 343 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring) (quotation omitted). 
 
In Riley's case, Liguori began his opening comments in 
the penalty phase by stating: 
 
        Let me say at the outset that what you do today is 
       automatically reviewed by our Supreme Court and that 
       is why there is an automatic review on the death 
       penalty. That is why, if you return a decision of death, 
       that is why you will receive and have to fill out a two- 
       page interrogatory that the Court will give you. This is 
       an interrogatory that specifically sets out the questions 
       that the State request and whether or not you believe 
       it beyond a reasonable doubt and if you want in your 
       determination, if you believe the sentence should be 
       death than each and every one of you has to sign this. 
       This goes to the Supreme Court. That is why it is 
       concise and we believe clear and it should be looked 
       carefully on and answered appropriately. 
 
App. at 393 (emphasis added). 
 
The majority concludes that this statement was accurate 
because Delaware law provides for automatic review of the 
jury's sentence. But, as in Caldwell, the automatic review 
conducted by the Delaware Supreme Court is extremely 
limited. At the time of Riley's sentencing hearing, the 
relevant portion of the capital sentencing statute provided: 
 
       The Supreme Court shall limit its review under this 
       section to the recommendation on and imposition of 
       the penalty of death and shall determine: 
 
       a. Whether, considering the totality of evi dence in 
       aggravation and mitigation which bears upon the 
       particular circumstances or details of the of fense and 
       the character and propensities of the of fender, the 
       death penalty was either arbitrarily or capriciously 
       imposed or recommended . . . . 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, S 4209(g)(2) (emphasis added). 
 
Like the prosecutor's statement in Caldwell , Liguori's 
reference to automatic appellate r eview was misleading as 
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to the scope of appellate review. As a majority of the Court 
explained in Caldwell, jurors may not understand the 
limited nature of that review, which af fords substantial 
deference to a jury's determination that death is the 
appropriate sentence. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330-31. 
Furthermore, jurors who are unconvinced that death is the 
appropriate punishment but who are eager to send a 
message of disapproval for the defendant's acts might be 
"very receptive to the prosecutor's assurance that [they] can 
more freely err because the error may be corrected on 
appeal." Id. at 331 (quotation omitted). As one of our sister 
circuits has explained, "[f]or the jury to see itself as 
advisory when it is not, or to be comforted by a belief that 
its decision will not have effect unless others make the 
same decision, is a frustration of the essence of the jury 
function." Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F .2d 1273, 1282 (5th Cir. 
1989). 
 
The majority suggests that Liguori's comments simply 
described to the jury the interrogatory for m they would 
have to answer during their deliberations. But the 
interrogatory form contained only two questions: whether 
the jury found, unanimously and beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that an aggravating circumstance existed,4 and, if 
the jury answered "yes," whether it unanimously 
recommended a sentence of death. Liguori's comments, 
then, were specifically directed to the jury's balancing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors and alerted the jury to 
the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court would 
automatically review its decision to impose a death 
sentence. 
 
"The sentencing decision in capital cases is bor n out of 
an inherent and unique mixture of anger , judgment and 
retribution, and requires a deter mination whether certain 
acts are so beyond the pale of community standards as to 
warrant the execution of their author." Id. at 1278. Perhaps 
more than any other decision render ed by a jury, a 
sentence of death is "irreducibl[y] discretionary." Id. Indeed, 
in Delaware the jury's weighing of aggravating and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The jury had already been instructed that, by convicting Riley of 
felony 
murder, it had already found that an aggravating circumstance existed. 
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mitigating circumstances was, for all practical purposes, 
final. I have found no published opinion during the relevant 
time period in which the Delaware Supreme Court reversed 
a jury's sentence of death as arbitrarily or capriciously 
imposed.5 
 
In Caldwell, the Supreme Court noted that "[b]elief in the 
truth of the assumption that sentencers treat their power to 
determine the appropriateness of death as an awesome 
responsibility has allowed this Court to view sentencer 
discretion as consistent with-and indeed as indispensable 
to-the Eighth Amendment's need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in 
a specific case." Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330 (quotation 
omitted). It follows that there is particular concern "when 
there are state-induced suggestions that the sentencing 
jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate 
court." Id. 
 
I am unwilling to treat the prosecutor's pointed reference 
to appellate review of this crucial decision as lightly as does 
the majority. A statement, like that made by the pr osecutor 
here, "can be literally true but quite misleading by failing, 
for example, to disclose information essential to make what 
was said not misleading." Sawyer, 881 F .2d at 1285. As a 
result, a violation of Caldwell may be established where a 
technically accurate statement describing the state 
appellate review process nonetheless "misled the jury to 
minimize its role in the sentencing process." Driscoll v. Delo, 
71 F.3d 701, 713 & n.10 (8th Cir. 1995) (prosecutor 
violated Caldwell by emphasizing that trial judge could 
disregard jury's recommendation of death; although 
technically an accurate statement of law, no state judge 
"ha[d] ever spared a murder er the death penalty when a 
jury ha[d] recommended it"). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Delaware capital sentencing scheme was substantially amended 
in 1991. Under the amended statute, the "jury now functions only in an 
advisory capacity. The judge, after taking the jury's recommendation into 
consideration, has the ultimate responsibility for determining whether 
the defendant will be sentenced to life imprisonment or death." State v. 
Cohen, 604 A.2d 846, 849 (Del. 1992). Of course, when Riley was 
sentenced the jury's death sentence was binding on the judge. 
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Given the limited nature of the Delawar e Supreme 
Court's review of a jury's sentence of death at the time, I 
believe that there was a Caldwell violation in this case. At 
no time did the prosecution bring the limited scope of 
review to the jury's attention and, despite the majority's 
statement to the contrary, nothing the trial court said could 
have corrected any misimpression left by the prosecution's 
comments.6 Moreover, although Liguori's remark was brief, 
the opening statement was too; it consumed only 3-1/2 
pages of transcript, 1/2 page of which was the passage 
reprinted above. It is clear that a statement does not have 
to be lengthy to be effective in suggesting to the jury that 
ultimate responsibility for sentencing lies elsewhere. Unlike 
the facts in Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 360 (5th Cir. 
1988), where the court held that the pr osecutor's statement 
that "[I]f, in fact, you do retur n the death penalty that 
yours will not be the last word. Every sentence is reviewed 
by the Supreme Court," was improper but cured by prompt 
defense objection and curative instruction, her e there was 
no curative instruction. 
 
On these facts, I disagree with the majority that the 
prosecutor's comments were simply "accurate unemotional, 
passing remarks in the context of describing the state 
statute." Maj. Op. at 42. Nothing in the r ecord indicates 
whether the statements were, in fact, "unemotional," and I 
find it curious that the only portion of the Delaware statute 
the prosecutor chose to explain was the pr ovision for 
automatic review of the jury's sentence. Caldwell and its 
progeny make clear that "the sentencing jury must 
continue to feel the weight of responsibility so long as it has 
responsibility." Sawyer, 881 F .2d at 1282. Because I believe 
that the prosecutor's remarks misled the jury into thinking 
the Delaware Supreme Court was the final arbiter of Riley's 
fate, I dissent from this portion of the majority opinion as 
well. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although the trial court informed the jury that it was bound by the 
jury's recommendation of death, the court said nothing whatsoever 
about appellate review. 
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IV. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I believe this is an appropriate case for the issuance of a 
writ of habeas corpus. One of the principal objections to the 
operation of the death penalty in this country is that it is 
applied unevenly, particularly against poor black 
defendants. I am afraid that the majority's decision will do 
nothing to dispel that view. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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